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Abstract
We investigate what it means for one act to be more ambiguous than another. The question
is evidently analogous to asking what makes one prospect riskier than another, but beliefs
are neither objective nor representable by a unique probability. Our starting point is an
abstract class of preferences constructed to be (strictly) partially ordered by a more ambi-
guity averse relation. First, we define two notions of more ambiguous with respect to such a
class. A more ambiguous (I) act makes an ambiguity averse decision maker (DM) worse off
but does not affect the welfare of an ambiguity neutral DM. A more ambiguous (II) act ad-
versely affects a more ambiguity averse DM more, as measured by the compensation they
require to switch acts. Unlike more ambiguous (I), more ambiguous (II) does not require
indifference of ambiguity neutral elements to the acts being compared. Second, we imple-
ment the abstract definitions to characterize more ambiguous (I) and (II) for two explicit
preference families: α-maxmin expected utility and smooth ambiguity. Thirdly, we give ap-
plications to the comparative statics of more ambiguous in a standard portfolio problem
and a consumption-saving problem.
JEL Classification Numbers: C44, D800, D810, G11
Keywords: Ambiguity, Uncertainty, Knightian Uncertainty, Ambiguity Aversion, Uncer-
tainty aversion, Ellsberg paradox, Comparative statics, Single-crossing, More ambiguous,
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1 Introduction
Consider a decision maker (DM) choosing among acts, choices with contingent conse-
quences. Following intuitive arguments of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961), pioneering
formalizations by Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and a body of sub-
sequent work, modern decision theory distinguishes two categories of subjectively uncer-
tain belief: unambiguous and ambiguous. An ambiguous belief cannot be expressed using
a single probability distribution. Intuitively, an event is deemed (subjectively) ambiguous
if the DM’s belief about the event, as revealed by his preferences, cannot be expressed as a
unique probability.1 The usual interpretation is that the DM is uncertain about the ‘true’
probability of the ambiguous event (and takes this uncertainty into account when making
his choice). A DM considers an act to be unambiguous if, for each set of consequences, its
inverse image is unambiguous. Otherwise, the act is ambiguous. In this paper we investi-
gate what makes one act more ambiguous than another.
One focus of the recent literature applying ideas of ambiguity to economic contexts, fi-
nance and macroeconomics in particular, is on how equilibrium trade in financial assets is
affected when agents seek assets that are ‘robust’ to the perceived ambiguity. A comparative
static question of interest in such models is, naturally, that of more ambiguous.2 We need
concepts of more ambiguous just as concepts of orders of riskiness were needed to facili-
tate comparative statics of ‘more risky’ in economic analysis. A first challenge arises in for-
mulating general defining principles of more ambiguous which, in keeping with revealed
preference traditions, are preference based but not tied down to particular parametric pref-
erence forms. A second, is to characterize the definitions for preference families commonly
encountered in applications.
We explore two related but different ideas for revealing (via choice behavior) whether
an act is more affected by ambiguity than another act. These ideas lead to two different or-
ders on the space of acts: more ambiguous (I) and more ambiguous (II). Essentially, an act
f is more ambiguous (I) than act g if an ambiguity averse DM prefers g to f but an ambi-
guity neutral DM is indifferent between the acts. Roughly put, an act f is more ambiguous
(II) than act g if the more ambiguity averse agent requires more compensation to give up
g for f . More ambiguous (I) is akin to the Rothschild-Stiglitz notion of more risky. What
lies at the heart of more ambiguous (II) is a strengthening of a single crossing condition:
the more ambiguity averse the ‘type’ of agent the greater the compensation she requires
to switch to the more ambiguous act. An advantage of the first definition is it allows us
to identify acts which may be differentiated purely and solely in terms how much they are
affected by ambiguity. An advantage of the second definition is it allows us to compare
acts on the basis of being differently affected by ambiguity even when they are different in
other dimensions, such as two assets with different average returns. In both instances the
order of more ambiguous arises on the back of a relation on preferences, more ambiguity
averse than. In the first definition, we compare the choice made by an ambiguity neutral
preference with that by an ambiguity averse preference; the second definition compares
the choice made by one preference to that by another which is more ambiguity averse. Fix-
ing a preference class partially ordered by a more ambiguity averse relation, the defining
1There is an extensive literature discussing the definition of ambiguous events, e.g., Epstein (1999), Ghi-
rardato and Marinacci (2002), Nehring (2001) and Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005).
2See, e.g., Hansen (2007), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Epstein and Schneider (2008), Hansen and
Sargent (2010), Uhlig (2010), Ju and Miao (2012), Collard, Mukerji, Tallon, and Sheppard (2011), Gollier (2011).
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properties determine whether that class deems an act to be more ambiguous than another
act.
We also study the case of events. Since bets on events are acts with binary outcomes,
the two notions of more ambiguous acts are shown to define analogous notions of more
ambiguous events. Conceptually, these notions take forward the literature on definitions of
ambiguous events and are likely to be of interest in applications too; such as, when inves-
tigating the effect of more ambiguous on contingent contracts.
The abstract definitions are implemented to characterize more ambiguous (I) and (II)
for two families of preferences prominent in applications: α-maxmin expected utility pref-
erences (α-MEU) and smooth ambiguity preferences. To fix ideas, in this introductory sec-
tion we focus on the results applying to the former family; as will be seen the results for the
other family are closely related. The α-MEU family generalizes the well known maxmin ex-
pected utility preferences due to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). For these preferences the
DM’s belief is represented by a compact, convex subset Π ⊆∆, of the set of all probability
measures on the state space. Acts are evaluated by a weighted average of the maximum
and minimum expected utility ranging over the setΠ of probabilities. Fixing the belief, the
greater the weight on the minimum expected utility, the greater the ambiguity aversion.
Each characterization result is predicated on a specified (strictly partially ordered) class
of preferences. Typically, elements of a class come from a single family, without further
restriction on ambiguity and risk attitudes but with a fixed belief. Fixing belief is natural
and necessary given that we are in a framework with subjective belief on states and choice
objects are acts, rather than lotteries involving given distributions on outcomes. In this
framework one needs such a restriction even when working with expected utility (say, to
investigate risk orders on acts) since under different beliefs the same act will induce corre-
spondingly different lotteries over outcomes; an act that is riskier under one belief can be
the opposite under another belief.3
The resulting characterizations are very natural. First, note that for the α-MEU class
with subjective belief fixed atΠ, preferences between a bet on an event E or an event E ′ are
determined by the closed intervals Π (E ) ≡ {π(E ) | π ∈ Π}, Π (E ′) ≡ {π(E ′) | π ∈ Π}. We show
that E is a more ambiguous (I) event than E ′ if and only if Π(E ) ⊃Π(E ′), with the intervals
sharing a common center. The characterization of E is a more ambiguous (II) event than
E ′ is that maxΠ(E )minΠ(E ) ≥
maxΠ(E ′)
minΠ(E ′) , and similarly for the complementary events (since our defini-
tion of more ambiguous event is symmetric between events and their complements). The
characterization of (P )-more ambiguous (I) events makes precise one sense in which the
probabilities of a more ambiguous event vary more as π ranges on Π. For a (P )-more am-
biguous (II) event there is a different sense of “vary more” : more elastic, a sense familiar
to us from elementary economic theory. We show the characterizing condition for more
ambiguous (II) may be formally interpreted as saying that the interval Π(E ) is more elastic
than Π(E ′). Our results, therefore, make concrete two senses in which a DM’s belief about
a more ambiguous4 event is less precise.
We next proceed to characterizing more ambiguous acts. The findings echo those for
3Our ideas, in particular those related to more ambiguous (II), transfer quite straightforwardly to domains
involving, purely, "objective" ambiguity as considered, e.g., in Olszewski (2007) and in Ahn (2008). There
preferences are formulated directly over given sets of lotteries and make no reference to a state space, acts
nor to any subjective belief. See Section 6 for a discussion and Appendix A.5 for formal details.
4It follows from these characterizations that for α-MEU preferences, a more ambiguous (I) event is also a
more ambiguous (II) event. However, for smooth ambiguity preferences a more ambiguous (I) event is not
generally a more ambiguous (II) event. See footnote 10 and Examples 3.1 and 3.2.
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events. For instance, for an α-MEU class with a given subjective belief Π and risk attitude
(but admitting a range of ambiguity attitudes), a more ambiguous (I) act will have a cen-
tered expansion of the interval of corresponding expected utilities. A more ambiguous (II)
act f has a translation, f +p such that, the interval of expected utilities of the less ambigu-
ous act g is contained in the interval of expected utilities for f + p . Thinking back to the
case of more risky, a virtue of that theory is that it supplies a constructive procedure to go
from a less risky lottery to a more risky lottery (e.g., through a sequence of mean-preserving
spreads). In that spirit, we provide sufficient conditions that show how more ambiguous
acts may be constructed. For more ambiguous (I), it is sufficient that the lottery induced by
less ambiguous act for eachπ ∈Π is constructed as a garbling of the set of lotteries induced
by the more ambiguous act corresponding to the set Π, while ensuring that centers of the
sets of lotteries induced by the two acts coincide. For more ambiguous (II), such a sufficient
condition is that as π ranges on Π, the set of lotteries induced by the more ambiguous act
contains the set of lotteries induced by the less ambiguous act.
We obtain characterizations under an additional restriction on the events and acts be-
ing compared: belief comonotonicity. A pair of events, E , E ′, is belief comonotone on Π if
for all π1,π2 ∈ Π, (π1(E )−π2(E )) (π1(E ′)−π2(E ′)) ≥ 0. Hence, belief comonotonicity for a
pair of events imposes a linear order µ on the set of probability measuresΠ. Evidently, this
condition gives a sense in which two events are (stochastically) similar, e.g., a bet on the
S&P increasing by 5% at close on a particular day and an analogous bet on the FTSE, but
not a bet on a stock market index and a bet on the outcome of a boxing match. That am-
biguity affects two belief comonotone events in a qualitatively similar way is evident from
behavior. We show that a pair of belief comonotone events are characterized, in preference
terms, by a lack of mutual hedging possibilities for (α-MEU) DMs. Belief comonotonicity
facilitates particularly clear and succinct characterizations. For example, the characteriz-
ing condition for E being more ambiguous (II) than E ′, is identical for smooth ambgiuity
and α-MEU preferences: π(E ) is more elastic than π(E ′) (as functions of π ∈Π).
There is a natural extension of the idea of belief comonotonicity to acts which enables
the analysis of the ambiguity of acts to be disaggregated into the analysis of the ambiguity of
certain families of (worse outcome) events defined by the acts. By this device more power-
ful characterizations than are available in the general case become available. Notably, the
conditions obtained make no reference to the DMs’ risk attitudes. Take the case of more
ambiguous (I) acts. We are able to define, for each act f , a joint distribution over outcomes
and beliefs which serves as a sort of ‘sufficient statistic’ for the act in that it contains all
the information relevant to choices between acts for the preference class. Given these joint
distributions, it is shown that more ambiguous (I) is characterized by the existing statisti-
cal notion of concordance. That is, conditioning on an “event” of the kind {π′ ∈∆ | π′ µ π}
makes the conditional distribution of outcomes worse by first-order stochastic dominance
for the more ambiguous act than the less ambiguous act. Therefore, a variation inπ affects
the probability distribution on outcomes more strongly in the case of the more ambiguous
act. We show, by an example, how the result can be applied to understand why a partic-
ular preference pattern may be chosen by ambiguity averse DMs in Machina’s “reflection”
example (Machina (2009)).
Finally, we discuss and illustrate the applicability of the theory developed here in some
standard economic problems under the belief comonotonicity assumption. We analyze
the standard portfolio choice problem with one safe and one uncertain asset and consider
the comparative static effect on the optimal portfolio weight when the uncertain asset is re-
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placed another which more ambiguous (I). We identify conditions that yield the “expected”
comparative static for theα-MEU case and for the smooth ambiguity case. Thirdly, we ana-
lyze an optimal savings problem in which future income is ambiguous, for a class ofα-MEU
and a class of smooth ambiguity preferences with risk attitude the CARA class. We explore
the impact on savings as future income becomes more ambiguous (II) and show that while
for the α-MEU class there is no impact, for the smooth ambiguity class the optimal savings
increase.
Related literature The literature on more ambiguous is rather spare. Segal (1987) an-
alyzes preferences over binary acts, e.g., (x , E ; 0,¬E ), where you win x if the event E occurs,
0 otherwise. The ambiguity concerning the probability of E is represented by a probabil-
ity distribution F ∗ on [0, 1] governing the probability that E occurs. Then, to rank “degrees
of ambiguity” , Segal adopts the criterion that G ∗ is more ambiguous than F ∗ if F ∗ crosses
G ∗ only at their common mean from below. Segal writes, referring to an ambiguity averse
DM, “one is tempted to assume that if G ∗ is more ambiguous than F ∗, then the value of
(x , E ; 0,¬E ) under F ∗ is greater than its value under G ∗” , but shows that this is not gen-
erally true. Segal’s counterexample naturally inspired us to think of preferences as the ap-
propriate starting point for primitive notions of more ambiguous. The analysis in Grant
and Quiggin (2005) is also related, but less so. It proceeds in a direction opposite to the one
taken in this paper: starting with a primitive notion of a more uncertain act it goes on to
characterize corresponding dual notions of more uncertainty averse for various preference
models where uncertainty is an encompassing notion that does not distinguish between
ambiguity and risk. Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) define a notion closely related to that of a
more ambiguous event and characterize it for the Expected Uncertain Utility theory of de-
cision making under ambiguity proposed and axiomatized in their paper. In our language,
their idea is captured by saying a class of preferences sharing the same belief considers an
event E to be (Gul-Pesendorfer) more ambiguous than another event E ′ if there is a pair of
preferences ̂, in the class with ̂more ambiguity averse than such that strictly prefers
a bet on E to a (same stake) bet on E ′ while ̂ prefers the bet on E ′. For the class of α-MEU
preferences with a given beliefΠ,α ∈ [0, 1], the definition is characterized by the subinterval
condition Π(E ′) ⊂ Π(E ). It is revealing to compare this with the characterizations of more
ambiguous (I) and (II) events (forα-MEU). Evidently, since this is an expansion, nested but
without requiring a common center, it implies more ambiguous (II) but is implied by more
ambiguous (I).5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, following a statement of the
formal setting, we present the definitions of more ambiguous acts and events in terms ab-
stract preference classes and describe, more fully, the two explicit, parametric preference
families applied in characterizations. Section 3 implements the definitions to characterize
more ambiguous events, while Section 4 does the same for more ambiguous acts. Section
5 explores the belief comonotonicity condition and characterizations that obtain with that
condition. Section 6 discusses applications and Section 7 concludes.
5See Remark 5.4 for a further discussion of the relation with more ambiguous (II).
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2 Decision theoretic considerations
2.1 Preliminaries




l :X → [0, 1] | l (x ) 6= 0 for finitely many x ’s in X and
∑
x∈X
l (x ) = 1
«
.
Let S be a separable metric space and let Σ be the Borelσ-algebra of subsets of S . Denote
by F0 the set of all Σ-measurable functions from S to L . Let F be a convex subset of L S
which includes all constant functions inF0. In the usual decision theoretic nomenclature,
elements of X are (deterministic) outcomes, elements of L are lotteries, elements of S are
states and elements of Σ are events. Elements of F are acts whose state contingent con-
sequences are elements of L . Hence, given f ∈ F and s ∈ S , f (s ) is a (finitely supported)
probability distribution on X while f (s ) (x ) denotes the probability of x ∈ X under f (s ) .
As usual, we may think of an element of L as a constant act, i.e., an act with the same con-
sequence in every state. Given an x ∈ X , δx ∈ L denotes a degenerate lottery such that




denote a uniform translation of the contingent distri-








= f (s ) (x ), s ∈ S , x ∈ X .
When there is no possibility of confusion, we will sometimes denote the lottery degener-
ate at y ∈ X simply by y , in particular we sometimes write f + y to denote f +δy . When
translating acts, it is necessary to avoid hitting the bounds of X . Let L J ⊂ L be the set of all
finitely supported lotteries for which outcomes lie in a subinterval J of X with |J | < |X |/3
and center coinciding with the center of X . Let FJ⊂F denote acts with consequences
whose outcomes lie in L J . For most of the paper we will not need to appeal to the full ar-
mory of Anscombe-Aumann acts, and acts with degenerate lottery consequences suffice:
let F̂ ⊂ F be the set of all acts mapping states to degenerate lotteries over outcomes in X
and let F̂J ⊂ F̂ be the set of acts with (degenerate) consequences in L J . If x , y ∈ X and
E ∈Σ, x E y denotes the binary act with a (degenerate) consequence x if the realized state
s ∈ E and y otherwise. We say x E y is a bet on E if x > y .
Let π :Σ→ [0, 1] be a countably additive probability. The set of all such probabilities, π,
is denoted by∆. Let C (S ) be the set of all continuous and bounded real-valued functions
on S . Using C (S ) we equip ∆ with the vague topology, that is, the coarsest topology on ∆
that makes the following functionals continuous: π 7→
´
ψdπ, for eachψ ∈C (S ) andπ ∈∆.
LetB∆ denote the Borelσ-algebra on∆ generated by the vague topology. LetBR andBX
denote the Borelσ-algebras ofR and of X , respectively. Givenπ ∈∆, any act f ∈F induces
a corresponding lottery, a probability distribution over outcomes. Formally, for the act f ,
defines the stochastic kernel6 (π, B ) 7→ P fπ (B ) from (∆,B∆) to (X ,BX ) such that





f (s )(x )dπ (s ) , B ∈BX . (1)
To save on notation, we sometimes write P fπ (x ) to denote the distribution function induced
by the act f given a probability π. Specifically, we write P fπ (x ) to denote P
f
π ((−∞, x ]∩ X ).
6P fπ defines a stochastic kernel since it is a probability measure on (X ,BX ) for eachπ ∈∆ and for each B ∈
BX , π 7→ P
f
π (B ) is a measurable function.
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Note that x 7→ P fπ (x ) is, therefore, well-defined on R ⊃ X . It is useful to note, given a com-






′,π′′ ∈Π⊂∆,λ ∈ [0, 1] . (2)
A binary relation  over F denotes a DM’s preference ordering over acts, the objects
of choice. Throughout, we will assume a DM’s preferences satisfy properties of weak order
and monotonicity, defined below.
Axiom 1. [Weak order] The preference  is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2. [Monotonicity] (i) If x , y ∈ X and x ≥ y then δx δy .
(ii) For every l , l ′ ∈ L , if l  l ′ and 0≤β <α≤ 1, then αl + (1−α)l ′ β l + (1−β )l ′.
(iii) For every f , g ∈F , f (s ) g (s ) for all s ∈ S implies f  g .
Note, (i) and (ii) of Axiom 2 ensures that preferences over lotteries respect first order
stochastic dominance, while (iii) ensures that preferences are state independent.
2.2 Defining more ambiguous
We define ordinal measures of how much the (subjective) evaluation of an act is affected,
relative to another act, by (subjectively perceived) ambiguity. The measures are calibrated
with reference to individual preferences by comparing how acts are evaluated by two pref-
erences, one of which is more ambiguity averse than the other. Hence, our starting point
is a notion of comparative ambiguity aversion. We adopt an established notion. Defini-
tion 2.1 is, essentially, a restatement of Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)
definitions of comparative uncertainty/ambiguity aversion which were, in turn, a natural
adaptation of Yaari (1969)’s classic formulation of comparative (subjective) risk aversion.
Just as the definition of comparative risk aversion requires an a priori definition of a risk-
free act, here the analogous role for “ambiguity-free” acts is played by lotteries.
Definition 2.1. Let P be a class of preferences overF . Let A,B∈ P . We say B is (P )-
more ambiguity averse than A if, for all l ∈ L and f ∈ F , f B l ⇒ f A l and f A l ⇒
f B l .
Remark 2.1. The above definition implies that if two preferences can be ordered in terms
of ambiguity aversion then they must rank lotteries in the same way.
As Epstein (1999) notes, to define absolute (rather than comparative) risk aversion, it is
necessary to adopt a “normalization” for risk neutrality. The standard normalization is ex-
pected value. Analogously, to obtain a notion of absolute ambiguity aversion it is necessary
to adopt a normalization for ambiguity neutrality. There are two normalizations prominent
in the literature. Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) say a preference is ambiguity neutral if
it is a subjective expected utility (SEU) preference. That is, for any f , g ∈ F , there exists a
utility function, u : X −→ R, and a subjective belief associated with the preference, π ∈∆,
such that,














u (x )g (s )(x )

dπ (s ) .
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In Epstein (1999), a preference  is ambiguity neutral if it is probabilistically sophisticated,
that is, a preference that ranks acts or lotteries solely on the basis of their implied probabil-
ity distributions over outcomes (Machina and Schmeidler (1992)). More precisely, letting
P be the set of all Borel probability measures on (X ,BX ),  is probabilistically sophisti-
cated if there exists a function W : P −→ R, and an associated belief π ∈ ∆, such that,








, f , g ∈F . We may use either of the above two normalizations of
ambiguity neutrality to obtain a corresponding notion of (absolutely) ambiguity averse: an
ambiguity averse preference is one that is more ambiguity averse than an ambiguity neutral
preference.
Although Definition 2.1 saysP is partially ordered by a more ambiguity averse relation,
this does not necessarily imply that there exists any distinct pair of preferences inP which
are ordered by the relation.
Definition 2.2. Let P be a class of preferences over F . We say P is strictly partially or-
dered by (P )-more ambiguity averse if for each ∈P there exists ′∈ P , 6=′, such that
 is (P )-more ambiguity averse than ′ or ′ is (P )-more ambiguity averse than .
The first notion of more ambiguous we offer is akin to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)’s
notion of more risky: given l1, l2 ∈ L , l1 is riskier than l2 if l1, l2 have the same mean and
every risk averter prefers l2 to l1. Given an ambiguity neutral DM and another who is more
ambiguity averse, we require that the ambiguity neutral DM be indifferent between the
two acts being compared while the ambiguity averse DM disprefers the more ambiguous
act. The definition is meant to work with either of the two notions of ambiguity neutrality
discussed.
Definition 2.3. LetP be a class of preferences overF strictly partially ordered by (P )-more
ambiguity averse and such that each∈P is related to an ambiguity neutral element ofP .
Given f , g ∈F , we say f is a (P )-more ambiguous (I) act than g , denoted f (P )-m.a.(I) g ,
if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i)if ∈P is ambiguity neutral then g ∼ f ;
(ii)for allA,B∈P such thatA is an ambiguity neutral preference andB is (P )-more
(respectively, less) ambiguity averse than A we have g B (B ) f .
The first condition ensures that the acts being compared do not differ in any aspect
that may be considered relevant by the sub-class that does not care about ambiguity. In
conjunction with condition (i), condition (ii) allows us to infer that f is more ambiguous;
by itself condition (ii) is not good enough, e.g., it may be satisfied if g has greater average
returns. The notion of an act being more ambiguous than another is calibrated with re-
spect to a reference classP , restricted to be a strictly partially ordered class of preferences.
A restriction on the class of preferences admitted is necessary in order that the definition
not be vacuous. It may be helpful to compare with the familiar study of risk (e.g. Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970)). Risk is generally studied for lotteries, rather than for acts defined on a
state space with subjective beliefs which may differ for different preferences. However, ev-
idently, the analysis of risk may be extended from lotteries to acts if the class of preferences
under discussion share the same subjective beliefs (so that an act corresponds to a unique
lottery). In Definition 2.3 whileP may well include several ambiguity neutral preferences,
incorporating different subjective beliefs and/or risk attitudes, by condition (i) however,
each ambiguity neutral preference must deem the acts being compared equivalent thereby
restricting the subjective belief associated with the ambiguity neutral preferences included.
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Furthermore, every preference included in the reference class may be ordered as more or
less ambiguity averse than some ambiguity neutral preference inP .
The requirement in Definition 2.3 that ambiguity neutral agents be indifferent between
the acts being compared is very natural but it has two drawbacks. First, we may wish to
compare acts with respect to how they are affected by ambiguity, even though they may
differ on other dimensions.7 Second, there are reference classes P of interest which do
not contain ambiguity neutral elements. For example, the set of all α-MEU preferences
sharing the same set of priors in the representation functional in general will not include
an ambiguity neutral sub-class (see Section 2.3). These two considerations motivate our
second definition of more ambiguous.
Definition 2.4. LetP be a class of preferences overF strictly partially ordered by (P )-more
ambiguity averse. Given acts f , g ∈FJ , we say f is a (P )-more ambiguous (II) act than g ,





















, whenever B is (P )-more ambiguity averse than A.








. In this case, the amount
p may be interpreted as a “compensating premium” ; it measures, behaviorally, A’s welfare
loss in giving up g for f . Hence, in this case, the defining property for f to be m.a.(II) than g
is that the compensating premium good enough for A is not good enough for B , who is more
ambiguity averse than A: an act is identified as more ambiguous (II) if the compensation
required to switch to it increases with ambiguity aversion.8 In general, since we have not









, and so p is an amount that does not sweeten f enough to persuade
A to give up g . Then, the definition requires that p won’t be enough to persuade B either,
whose preference is more ambiguity averse than A’s. More abstractly, an equivalent way of
thinking of the m.a.(II) definition is that it requires that arbitrary translations of acts being
compared satisfy a single crossing property for ambiguity:





, satisfies the single crossing property for ambiguity with respect toP , if for all
B (P )-more ambiguity averse than A, g A (A) f ⇒ g B (B ) f .
This property identifies an act as being more affected by ambiguity simply by check-
ing the effect of increasing ambiguity aversion on the direction of preference. It defines a
fundamental comparative static in that it applies even when the acts being compared dif-
fer in other aspects; in contrast to m.a.(I), which applies only when the acts are identical
apart for the way they are affected by ambiguity.9 However, single crossing is not generally
7Analogous issues limit the applicability of the Rothschild-Stiglitz notion of more risky. For example, ac-
cording to this notion, a lottery is not more risky than a degenerate lottery unless support of the latter is its
mean. Such issues led to the development other notions of increasing risk, e.g., Jewitt (1989).
8Notice such “inter-preferential” comparison is very much a part of m.a.(I) too, and therefore of more risky
(Rothschild-Stiglitz). In m.a.(I) we compare the preference of a ambiguity neutral DM with that of a DM who
is not ambiguity neutral.
9The analog of Definition 2.5 for risk (with subjective beliefs) allows that the acts differ in aspects other
than riskiness (such as different means) but as risk aversion increases, f tends to become less attractive than
g due to f having a greater riskiness component. IfP is taken to be SEU preferences with nondecreasing vNM
utility and identical belief,π, the condition is equivalent to the distribution functions P fπ (x ), P
g
π (x ), satisfying
a single crossing property, see e.g. Gollier (2001), chapter 7. We make use of this fact below (Lemma A.2).
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transitive. Hence, m.a.(II) is constructed to be ‘single crossing plus’, where the ‘plus’ is the
requirement that single crossing continues to be satisfied following arbitrary translations of
f . The role of this extra requirement is to ensure transitivity of the (m.a.(II)) relation. Note,
given Monotonicity, f is m.a.(II) g if, wheneverB is more ambiguity averse thanA andδp








then q ≥ p . Thus, a m.a.(II) act adversely
affects a more ambiguity averse DM more, as measured by the compensation they require
to switch acts. By focusing on the marginal effect (on the welfare loss in giving up g for f )
exclusively due to an increase in ambiguity aversion, the defining property is effective even
when g and f differ in ways other than how they are affected by ambiguity.10
2.2.1 More ambiguous events
As noted in the Introduction, it is of interest to define (comparative) ambiguity of events.
Preferences for betting on one event rather than another should reveal (a subjective view)
as to how much the event is affected by ambiguity compared to the other event.
Definition 2.6. Let P be a class of preferences over F strictly partially ordered by (P )-
more ambiguity averse. Given events E , E ′ ∈ Σ, we say E is a (P )-more ambiguous (I)
event than E ′ if x E y is a (P )-more ambiguous (I) act than x E ′y , for all x , y ∈ X . Similarly,
we say E is a (P )-more ambiguous (II) event than E ′ if x E y is a (P )-more ambiguous (I)
act than x E ′y , for all x , y ∈ X .
Thus, any bet on a more ambiguous event has to be a more ambiguous act, and we re-
quire the same to hold of bets on corresponding complementary events. The m.a.(I) notion
would require an ambiguity neutral preference to be indifferent between betting on either
event while an ambiguity averse preference dis-prefers the more ambiguous event. On the
other hand, m.a.(II) does not require an ambiguity neutral preference to be so indifferent
and would conclude E was more ambiguous than E ′ if the compensation demanded for
swapping a bet on E ′ for a bet on E increased with ambiguity aversion.
2.3 Parametric families of preferences considered in characterizations
We will apply the definitions to characterize more ambiguous for two parametric families
of preferences, the α-maxmin expected utility (α-MEU) family and the smooth ambiguity
family. Next, we provide a brief description of these families.
The α-MEU model (Hurwicz (1951), Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004),
henceforth, GMM)11 represents preferences over acts inF according to,







u (x ) f (s )(x )








u (x ) f (s )(x )

dπ (s ) , (3)
10Note, the two definitions of more ambiguous are distinct in that neither relation is strictly weaker than
the other. The first definition, requires an ambiguity neutral benchmark, unlike the second. The second
definition satisfies a single crossing property. Just as the Rothschild-Stiglitz notion does not generally satisfy
single crossing, neither does the relation generated by Definition 2.3.
11The functional form was first suggested by Hurwicz. GMM axiomatizes a functional form of which the
α-MEU form is a special case. However, Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey, and Koshevoy (2011) show that the GMM
axiomatization does not provide a complete foundation to the special α-MEU case, in particular when the
state space, S is finite. Klibanoff, Mukerji, and Seo (2011) suggest a preference based foundation for inter-
preting the set Π as belief.
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where u : X −→R is a nondecreasing (Bernoulli) utility function representing risk attitude,
Π ⊂∆ is weak*-compact, convex and represents the belief associated with the preference,
and α ∈ [0, 1] is a weight interpreted as an index of ambiguity attitude. Let P Mu ,Π denote a
class α-MEU preferences with given u and Π but with α ranging over the interval [0, 1].12
When u ranges over a set U ,P MU ,Π ≡∪u∈UP
M
u ,Π. In the characterizations of more ambiguous
to follow, we typically set U =U1, the set of nondecreasing utilities. Let A,B∈ P MU1,Π. By
Proposition 12 in GMM, A is (P MU1,Π)-more ambiguity averse than B⇔ αA ≥ αB , and uA
and uB are equal up to an affine transformation, where αA, uA, and αB , uB are associated
with A and B , respectively.
The smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), henceforth,
KMM)13 represents preferences over acts according to,













dµ (π) , (4)
where, u : X −→R is a nondecreasing utility function representing risk attitude, µ :B∆ −→
[0, 1], a probability measure on ∆ represents the belief associated with the preference and
φ : u (X ) −→R is a strictly increasing function representing ambiguity attitude. LetP Su ,µ,Φ,
denote the class of smooth ambiguity preferences with a givenµ and u and whereφ ranges
over some set Φ(u ) of functions φ. When u ranges over a set U , P SU ,µ,Φ ≡
⋃
u∈U P Su ,µ,Φ. In
the characterizations of more ambiguous to follow, we typically set Φ(u ) = Φ1(u ), the set of
strictly increasing φ and writeP SU1,µ,Φ1(u ) ≡P
S
U1,µ
. Let A, B∈P SU1,µ. Then, by Theorem 2 in
KMM,A is (P SU1,µ)-more ambiguity averse thanB⇔φA = h◦φB , where h :φB (u (X ))→R
is concave, and uA and uB are equal up to an affine transformation, where uA,φA and uB ,φB
are associated with A and B , respectively.
A belief µ, associated with a smooth ambiguity preference, put together with an act,
induces a joint probability measure on outcomes and probability distributions over states.
For each act f ∈F , and B ∈BX , π 7−→ P fπ (B ) is aB∆ measurable function. The measure µ
therefore uniquely14 defines, for each act f ∈F , a probability measure P f ,µ on (X ×∆,BX ×
B∆) such that for every C ∈B∆, B ∈BX ,
P f ,µ(B ×C ) =
ˆ
C
P fπ (B )dµ(π). (5)
Recall, the definition of m.a.(I) invokes the existence of an ambiguity neutral element in
the relevant preference class. The class P SU1,µ includes an SEU preference: the case where
φ is affine. However, for a given compact, convex Π⊂∆,P MU1,Π, does not in general contain
an SEU preference. Rogers and Ryan (2012) shows the α-MEU preference (Π, 0.5, u ) is an
ambiguity neutral (SEU) preference if and only if Π is centrally symmetric.15
12Henceforth, whenever we refer to a compact Π ⊂∆, representing belief associated with an α-MEU pref-
erence, we mean it is weak*-compact.
13For other preference models with similar representations see Ergin and Gul (2009), Nau (2006), Neilson
(2010) and Seo (2009).
14See, e.g., Meyer (1966), T14, p.15.
15An α-MEU preference represented with a given centrally symmetric Π, may be alternatively parameter-
ized as an MEU preference or a maxmax EU preference with a different representation set of priors (a set that
varies with theα in the original representation). In the alternative parametric representation attitudes to am-
biguity and beliefs are not separated, which makes it less useful for conducting comparative static exercises
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Definition 2.7. A setΠ⊆∆ is centrally symmetric if there existsπ? ∈Π(called the center of
Π) such that, for any π ∈∆, π ∈Π⇔π?− (π−π?) ∈Π.
As noted in KMM, SEU preferences are the only probabilistically sophisticated prefer-
ences within the smooth ambiguity class (so long as preferences over lotteries are expected
utility). Marinacci (2002), shows SEU preferences are the only probabilistically sophisti-
cated preferences within the class of α-MEU preferences defined over acts whose domain
includes at least one unambiguous event which is assigned a strictly positive probability
by the subjective belief(s) associated with the preferences in the class. Hence, essentially,
it is without loss of generality for us to assume SEU as the benchmark model for ambiguity
neutrality for α-MEU preferences.
3 Characterizing more ambiguous events
3.1 More ambiguous (I)
α-MEU preferences At the outset, it is important to note that, since application of Def-
inition 2.6 requires the existence of an ambiguity neutral element in the preference class,
ambiguity neutrality is required for the full set of actsF and not just on bets on the events
being compared. Hence, we characterize the definition for a class of preferences corre-
sponding to a belief described by a compact, convex, centrally symmetric Π ⊂ ∆.16 Given
an event E ∈Σ, since Π is compact convex, the set of points π(E ) ∈ [0, 1] as π ranges over Π
is a closed interval which we denote asΠ(E ) = {π(E ) |π ∈Π}= [minΠ(E ), maxΠ(E )]⊂ [0, 1].
This interval has center 12 minΠ(E ) +
1
2 maxΠ(E ). It is easy to check, denoting the center of
Π as π?, that 12 minΠ(E ) +
1
2 maxΠ(E ) =π
?(E ).
Proposition 3.1. LetP =P MU1,Π, where Π is a compact, convex centrally symmetric subset of
∆with center π?. Consider two events, E , E ′ ∈Σ. The following are equivalent:
(i) E is a (P )-more ambiguous (I) event than E ′;
(ii) Π(E ′)⊂Π(E ) and π?(E ′) =π?(E ).
One naturally expects Π(E ) to expand in some way as the event E is substituted for a
more ambiguous one. The above proposition shows that Π(E ) expands while retaining the
same center. The retention of the same center ensures that ambiguity neutral elements in
the preference class consider a bet on E to be indifferent to a (same stakes) bet on E ′.
Smooth ambiguity preferences To assist with intuition, we state the analog for smooth
ambiguity preferences for the case where µ has finite support.
Proposition 3.2. Let P =P SU1,µ, where suppµ = {πi ∈∆ | i = 1, ..., m}. Consider two events,
E , E ′ ∈Σ. The following are equivalent:
(involving more ambiguity averse/ more ambiguous). At the same time, the reparameterization shows the
central symmetry assumption puts a strong restriction on the class of preferences admitted. Note central
symmetry invoked for characterizing m.a.(I) only; the restriction is not required for m.a.(II). Finally, Sinis-
calchi (2009) shows if we add his Complementary Independence Axiom to the MEU model the set of repre-
senting priors are centrally symmetric, thus indicating a behavioral basis for assuming Central Symmetry.
16Note, the characterizations of more ambiguous derived depend on the ordinal properties of the refer-
enced preference class, rather than any particular representation chosen for it. See Appendix B for details.
11
(i) E is a (P )-more ambiguous (I) event than E ′;









ki jµ j . (7)
Equation (6) implies each π(E ′), π ∈Π, is contained in the convex hull of {π(E ) |π ∈Π};
given Π, the corresponding event probabilities of E ′ lie in a more circumscribed set than
those for E . Hence, as counterpart to Π(E ′) ⊂ Π(E ) in condition (ii) of Proposition 3.1 we
have:
co{π1(E ′), ...,πm (E ′)} ⊂ co{π1(E ), ...,πm (E )}. (8)
Notice, conditions (6 and 8) make no reference to a second order probability distribution
beyond the determination of its support. Condition (7) however, implies that theµ-average









ki jπi (E )µ j =
∑m
j=1
µ jπ j (E ). (9)
Hence, analogous to the requirement π?(E ′) = π?(E ) in Proposition 3.1 here it is required
that the convex hulls of E , E ′, share the same barycenter, reflecting the condition that am-
biguity neutral elements of P consider the bets on E and E ′ indifferently. Evidently, the
characterizing condition may be understood as saying that the (second order) distribution
on probabilities of the more ambiguous event is a ‘mean preserving spread’17 of the distri-
bution on the probabilities of the less ambiguous event.
3.2 More Ambiguous (II)
The characterization of (P )-more ambiguous (I) events makes precise one sense in which
the event probabilities of more ambiguous events vary more with π, the distribution on
the state space. For (P )-more ambiguous (II) events there will be a different sense of “vary
more” which is also very natural: more elastic. To set the scene, recall the elementary the-
ory of supply, in which one nondecreasing supply function, eS (p ), is said to be more elas-
tic than another, S (p ), if for the same increase in price, the proportionate increase in eS is
greater than the proportionate increase in S : equivalently, the ratio
eS
S is increasing in the
price.18 The latter condition evidently implies that there exists a nondecreasing function
η such that S = η ◦ eS and (since eS and S are both nondecreasing) that the map eS 7→ eS
η◦eS is
17Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), give a number of conditions equivalent to Increasing Risk including one
defined by a sequence mean preserving spreads. Müller and Stoyan (2002) give a useful summary of the
mathematical literature. Our characterization takes a somewhat different form which is more insightful in
the present context. For instance, it is useful in demonstrating the close connection to the characterization
in Proposition 3.1 through equation (6), which does not refer to the second order prior (beyond its support).
18The equivalence may be seen as follows. Let the ratio of two supply functions,
eS (p )
















d ln eS (p )
d ln p
>




nondecreasing. Since ηmaps a more elastic function to a less elastic one, we might say its
defining property is that it is elasticity reducing. In our context, for example, if there is such
a function η : Π(E )→ [0, 1] for which π(E ′) = η (π(E )), then E ′ is evidently less sensitive to
variations in π ∈ Π than is E . Next, we formally define a map to have the elasticity reduc-
ing property in a way that it makes it readily applicable to our context where points in the
domain and range of the map are event probabilities.19 In particular, we will require that
this property holds for the complements of the events, as well as for the events themselves.
This is natural since our definition of more ambiguous is symmetric between events and
their complements.
Definition 3.1. Let A ⊂ [0, 1]. We will say a nondecreasing function η : A→ [0, 1] is elasticity








α-MEU preferences Since the m.a.(II) notion does not impose any requirement on an
ambiguity neutral preference (and, in fact, does not even require the inclusion of any such
preference in the reference class of preferences), we are not restricted to preferences with
centrally symmetricΠ. In this case, it is intuitive to expect the characterization generalizes
the condition of Proposition 3.1 by not requiring the expansion to be centered.
Proposition 3.3. Let P = P MU1,Π, where Π is a compact, convex subset of ∆. Consider two
events, E , E ′ ∈Σ. The following are equivalent:
(i) E is a (P )-more ambiguous (II) event than E ′;
(ii) There exists an elasticity reducing function η : Π(E ) → [0, 1] such that minΠ(E ′) =
η(minΠ(E )) and maxΠ(E ′) =η(maxΠ(E )).
In other words, maxΠ(E )minΠ(E ) ≥
maxΠ(E ′)
minΠ(E ′) , and similarly for the complements (which follows from
the definition of elasticity reducing). Thus, restricting attention to the extremal event prob-
abilities, which are all we need to look at given these preferences, the probability of the
more ambiguous event (and its complement) varies proportionately more as π ranges on
Π. Notice, the the subinterval conditionΠ(E ′)⊂Π(E ) implies the condition (ii) in the above
proposition; condition (ii) makes evident a more general sense in which the DM may have
a less precise belief. For α-MEU preferences, a more ambiguous (I) event is also a more
ambiguous (II) event but the converse is false.
Example 3.1. Consider two events E and E ′such that Π(E ) = [0.3, 0.7] and Π(E ′) = [0.6, 0.8].
Clearly, for the preference classP MU1,Π, whereΠ is compact, convex, E is an m.a.(II) event than
E ′ since maxΠ(E )minΠ(E ) ≥
maxΠ(E ′)
minΠ(E ′) . But E is not an m.a.(I) event than E
′ since the subinterval condi-
tion fails. To fix ideas, think of a variation of Ellsberg’s 2-color, 2-urn example, in which the
subject is given imprecise information about the composition of both urns, as opposed to the
usual example where there is imprecise information about one urn. Each urn has a total of
100 balls, red and/or black. Let E be the event that a red ball is drawn from the urn I which,
the subject is told, has between 30 and 70 red balls and let E ′ be the draw of a red ball from
urn II which is known to have between 60 and 80 red balls.
19Elasticity reducing is closely related to star-shapedness. A standard definition of a star-shaped function
on [0, 1] satisfying η(0) = 0 is that x 7→ η(x )/x is increasing. In Proposition 3.4 we will define a relation on
distributions which is closely related to the star-shaped ordering of Barlow and Proschan (1975).
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Smooth ambiguity preferences
Proposition 3.4. Let P = P SU1,µ. Consider two events, E , E
′ ∈ Σ. The following are equiva-
lent:
(i) E is a (P )-more ambiguous (II) event than E ′;
(ii) There exists an elasticity reducing function η : {π (E )}π∈suppµ → [0, 1] such that π(E ′)
has the same distribution, under µ, as η(π(E )). Specifically,
µ({π ∈∆ |π(E ′)≤ q }) =µ({π ∈∆ |η(π(E ))≤ q }, q ∈ [0, 1] .
Consider a probability interval for E with a corresponding event ΠE in ∆. The charac-
terizing condition asserts the existence of a probability interval for E ′, with a corresponding
eventΠE ′ in∆with measure µ(ΠE ′) =µ(ΠE ), such that the probability of the more ambigu-
ous event, E , varies proportionately more than the probability of E ′, on the respective in-
tervals. Again, evidently, the DM has a less precise belief about the probability of the more
ambiguous (II) event.
Remark 3.1. There is a deeper common theme between Propositions 3.4 and 3.3. The
revealed preference implications (for the choices used in defining more ambiguous (II)
events) would be identical for preferences in P MU1,Π, if the set {(π(E ),π(E
′)) |π ∈Π} were
replaced by the convex hull of (minΠ(E ′), minΠ(E )) and (maxΠ(E ′), maxΠ(E )). For prefer-
ences inP SU1,µ choices depend on the probability distribution induced over {(π(E ),π(E
′)) |π ∈∆}
by the measure µ. However, since choices depend only on the marginal probability distri-
butions over the sets {π(E ) |π ∈∆} and {π(E ′) |π ∈∆} we are at liberty to substitute the
original probability distribution with any other having the same marginals and the gist of
Proposition 3.4 is that we can choose these marginal distributions to be comonotonic in
the sense thatπ(E ′) =η(π(E )) on suppµ for a nondecreasing η. Suppose, for the purpose of
illustration, suppµ=Π. Then, for both of these revealed preference equivalent transforma-
tions ofΠ, the transformedΠ should lie within the graph of an elasticity reducing function.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 in Appendix C.
Example 3.2. We show in this example for smooth ambiguity preferences a more ambiguous
(I) event is not generally a more ambiguous (II) event. The key intuitive point underlying
the construction of the example is that a mean preserving preserving spread may not sat-
isfy single-crossing. LetP =P SU1,µ and the support ofµ consist of four elements,π,π
′,π′′,π′′′.
Supposeπ(E ′) =π′(E ′) = 0.3,π′′(E ′) =π′′′(E ′) = 0.7,π(E ) = 0,π′(E ) = 0.6,π′′(E ) = 0.6,π′′′(E ) =
0.8, µ(π) = µ(π′) = µ(π′′) = µ(π′′′) = 0.25. Then it is easy to confirm that E is a m.a.(I) event
than E ′. Take the case of linear utility and suppose the DM receives 1 if the event occurs and
zero if the even does not occur. Letφ(u ) =min{u , 0.7} φ̂(u ) =min{u , 0.65}, so φ̂ is an increas-









when p = 1/30. However, with this p ,
´






dµ therefore E is not
m.a.(II) than E ′.
4 Characterizing more ambiguous acts
We move on to characterizing more ambiguous acts. The organization and structure of this
section follows that of the preceding section giving characterizations in the case of events.
We consider, in turn, m.a.(I) and m.a.(II) and for each, characterize the notion for α-MEU
and smooth ambiguity preferences. However, to set ideas, we begin with two examples.
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Example 4.1. Consider a model where the return of the an asset is uncertain and ambigu-
ous in the sense that there is uncertainty about the probability distribution governing each
random return. We adopt the framework of Hara and Honda (2016) in describing this un-
certainty. The uncertainty about return is conceptualized as a consequence of model un-
certainty: we assume the defining property of a model is that it fixes a probability distri-
bution for each random return, X i , and the model itself is a random variable, M , where
Mi ∈ R denotes the mean return of asset i conditional on model M . In this set up, model
uncertainty only affects the (conditional) mean of the return, not the (conditional) variance,
which is identical under each model realization. The conditional mean of the return has
a Normal distribution as does the “second order belief” describing the random variable M :








) and unconditional distribution







Example 4.2. We consider an investor with smooth ambiguity preferences with CARA type
risk aversion θ , i.e., u (x ) = −e x p (−θ x ) and overall utility V (Z ) = E

φ (E u (Z )|M )

where
φ(z ) = −(−z )γ/θ . If γ = θ , V is a standard expected utility functional. If γ > θ the decision
maker is ambiguity averse. Denoteη≡ γθ −1=
γ−θ
θ , which is the coefficient of ambiguity aver-
sion of the decision maker. Given this class of preferences and beliefs about returns described
above, the investor will evaluate a unit of asset i (i.e., evaluate a portfolio consisting entirely
of a unit of asset i ) as:











Indeed, these preferences coincide with the robust mean variance preferences posited in
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Ruffino (2013).
We may show that Asset 1 is more ambiguous (I) than asset 2 for this class of preferences
iff µ1 = µ2, σ1 = σ2, and σM1 > σ
M
2 . Ambiguity neutrality implies γ− θ = 0 and ambiguity
aversion is given by γ− θ > 0. Hence, the requirement that V (1) = V (2) for all θ > 0 and
γ−θ = 0 implies µ1 =µ2 andσ1 =σ2. Given this holds, V (1)< V (2) for all ambiguity averse
preferences in the class obtains if and only ifσM1 >σ
M
2 .
On the other hand, since [V (1)−V (2)] is decreasing in η while holding θ constant, we
have Asset 1 is more ambiguous (II) than asset 2 for the class of preferences under considera-
tion if and only ifσM1 >σ
M
2 .
4.1 More ambiguous (I)
We characterize m.a.(I) acts for the classes P MU1,Π and P
S
U1,µ
. However, the characterizing
conditions will refer to u , an arbitrary utility in U1. We also give sufficient conditions which
do not depend on u . For each preference class the sufficient conditions are expressed in
two parts. The first, which is common to both, is a ‘garbling’ condition on the probabil-
ity distribution over outcomes induced by the acts. The second is a ‘balance’ preserving
condition which ensures indifference of the ambiguity neutral elements of the preference
classes.
Definition 4.1. Let Π ⊂ ∆ and let f ∈ F . We say a stochastic kernel (π, C ) 7→ Kπ(C ) from
(Π,BΠ) to itself π-garbles act f into act g ∈F if for all B ∈BX ,
P gπ′ (B ) =
ˆ
Π
P fπ (B )d Kπ′(π),π
′ ∈Π. (10)
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We say g is a π-garbling of f if there exists a stochastic kernel such that (10) obtains.
Hence, P gπ′ (B ),π ∈Π, probabilities of a set of outcomes under act g lie in a more circum-
scribed set than those for the same set of outcomes under act f , analogous to condition
(8):
co{P gπ (B ) |π ∈Π} ⊂ co{P
f
π (B ) |π ∈Π}, B ∈BX .
As with condition (8), theπ-garbling condition makes no reference to a second order prob-
ability distribution. We state next a notion of preserving balance that applies to α-MEU
preferences.
Definition 4.2. Let Π be a compact, convex centrally symmetric subset of ∆ with center π?,
and let f ∈ F . We say the stochastic kernel (π, C ) 7→ Kπ(C ) from (Π,BΠ) to itself is ( f ,Π)-
center preserving (or, if clear from the context, simply center preserving) if for all Borel sets
B ∈BX ,
P fπ?(B ) =
ˆ
Π
P fπ (B )d Kπ?(π). (11)
If there is a center preserving stochastic kernel which π-garbles f into g , we say the π-
garbling is center preserving. Then (from substituting π? into (10)) the acts share the same
distribution of outcomes at the belief over states π=π?:
P fπ?(B ) = P
g
π?(B ), B ∈BX . (12)
Hence, any ambiguity neutral element inP MU1,Π will be indifferent between the acts.
The second notion of preserving balance applies to smooth ambiguity. It is:
Definition 4.3. Let µ be a probability measure on (∆,B∆). Let Kπ be a stochastic kernel
(π, C ) 7→ Kπ(C ) from (∆,B∆) to (∆,B ′), whereB ′ ⊂B∆ is a is a sub-sigma algebra. We say
Kπ is measure−µ preserving (or, if clear from the context, simply measure preserving) if for





If there exists a measure-µ preserving stochastic kernel Kπ from (∆, B∆) to itself which
π-garbles f into g , we say theπ-garbling is measure-µpreserving. It is useful to note (from
integrating both sides of (10)) that then the acts share the same µ-averaged distribution
over outcomes:
P g ,µ(B ×∆) =
ˆ
∆
P gπ (B )dµ(π) =
ˆ
∆
P fπ (B )dµ(π) = P
f ,µ(B ×∆), B ∈BX . (14)
Hence, every ambiguity neutral element inP SU1,µ is indifferent between the acts.
α-MEU preferences. The following proposition is a natural generalization of the center
preserving expansion condition in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 4.1. LetΠ be a compact, convex centrally symmetric subset of∆with center π?.
Let f , g ∈ F̂ . In the following, (i) and (ii) are equivalent and (iii) implies (i) and (ii).




−more ambiguous (I) act than g .










u ( f )dπ? =
´
u (g )dπ?.
(iii) There exists a center preserving stochastic kernel from (Π,BΠ) to itself whichπ-garbles
f into g .
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The equivalence condition is that the interval of expected utilities, induced by the given
u and π ranging on the given Π acting on the more ambiguous act, contains the one simi-
larly induced via the less ambiguous act with both intervals sharing a common center. The
sufficient condition, described by aπ-garbling, is independent of u : it is a condition linking
the two sets of distributions on outcomes induced by the two acts (and Π). It is sufficient





suring that P fπ? = P
g
π? .
Smooth ambiguity preferences. The next proposition similarly generalizes Proposition
3.2.









π . In the following,
(i) and (ii) are equivalent and (iii) implies (i) and (ii).




−more ambiguous (I) act than g .
(ii) For each u ∈U1 there is a measure-µpreserving stochastic kernel (π, C ) 7→ K uπ (C ) from





fu (π)d K uπ′ (π),π
′ ∈∆
(iii) There is a measure-µ preserving stochastic kernel (π, C ) 7→ Kπ(C ) from (∆,B∆) to
itself which π-garbles f into g .
The action of the stochastic kernel in condition (ii) implies
co{gu (π) |π ∈ suppµ} ⊂ co{fu (π) |π ∈ suppµ}, (15)
with the two convex hulls having the same (µ-weighted) barycenter (analogous to condi-
tion (ii) in Proposition 4.1). As in the previous proposition, the sufficient condition is de-
scribed by a measure preserving π-garbling which does not refer to a particular u ∈ U1.




π∈suppµ while ensuring that the acts induce the sameµ-averaged distribution over out-
comes.
4.2 More ambiguous (II)
α-MEU preferences.
Proposition 4.3. Let f , g ∈ F̂J . The following are equivalent:




-more ambiguous (II) act than g ;








u ( f +p )dπ>min
π∈Π
ˆ
u (g )dπ ⇒max
π∈Π
ˆ




Two kinds of cases satisfy the single crossing property in (ii). First, a somewhat trivial
case is when g is such that expected utility of g for every π ∈Π is either, equal to the utility
corresponding to the best outcome or, equal to the utility corresponding to the worst out-




-m.a.(II) than g if and only if, given any u ∈U1, there
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exists a translation p such that, the interval of expected utilities for g is contained in the















u (( f +p ))dπ, max
π∈Π
ˆ
u (( f +p ))dπ

.
Note, the latter case will hold if the set of lotteries on outcomes induced by g and π ∈ Π
is contained in the set of lotteries on outcomes induced by f and π ∈ Π. This gives us a
sufficient condition for constructing a more ambiguous act from a given act and one that
holds independently of u ∈U1.
Smooth ambiguity preferences.
Proposition 4.4. Let f , g ∈ F̂J . The following are equivalent:




-more ambiguous (II) act than g ;




























u (g )dπ≤ ν2
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.




-m.a.(II) than g if and only if the probability distribution on
expected utilities induced by every translation of f , given u and µ, crosses the distribution
so induced by g at most once and if so, from above. So, while m.a.(I) is characterized by
a mean preserving spread condition, here it is a single crossing condition showing, essen-
tially, that the expected utility of the more ambiguous act, considered as a function of π,
has a steeper gradient, as the following example illustrates.
Example 4.3. Let acts f , g both be constant on an event E and on the complement of E ,
E c , with f (E c ) = f1 < g (E c ) = g1 < g (E ) = g2 < f (E ) = f2 . Hence, for p ∈ R,
´
u ( f +
p )dπ and
´









u ( f +p )dπ≥
´


























as a function ofπ(E ) ,
´
u ( f +p )dπ has a larger gradient than does
´















u (g )dπ = ν1,
then
´
u ( f +p )dπ≥ ν1. Moreover for any π ∈∆ with
´
u (g )dπ > ν1, i.e. those with a larger















u (g )dπ≤ ν2
	
, as required.
In our next example, like in examples 4.1 and 4.2, we consider a model where the return
of the an asset is uncertain and can be ambiguous in the sense that there is uncertainty
about the probability distribution governing each random return and model uncertainty
only affects the (conditional) mean of the return, not the (conditional) variance, which is
identical under each model realization. Furthermore, the return conditional on model re-
alization has a Normal distribution, (X i |M ) ∼N (Mi ,σi ) and E (M ) =mi . However, unlike
in those examples, here we allow the “second order belief” describing the random variable
M to be not Normal. In the example, we characterize more ambiguous (II) for this class of
preferences.
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Example 4.4. In this case, writingφ (u ) =φ (−e −αu ), we have Asset 1 is more ambiguous (II)
































ever φ is increasing and φ̂ is an increasing concave transformation of φ. By Theorem 2 of
Landsberger and Meilijson (1994), this is equivalent to M1 is more Bickel-Lehman dispersed
than M2. In this case, with non-Gaussian second-order belief, more ambiguous (II) proves to
be more tractable than more ambiguous (I).
5 Adding belief comonotonicity
5.1 When events are belief comonotone
5.1.1 Definition and behavioral meaning
As discussed in Section 1 belief comonotonicity describes a sense in which we may think
of a bet on event E and a bet on event E ′ as ‘similar’.
Definition 5.1. A pair of events E , E ′ ∈Σ is belief comonotone onΠ⊂∆ if for allπ1,π2 ∈Π,
(π1(E )−π2(E )) (π1(E ′)−π2(E ′))≥ 0.
Belief comonotonicity for a pair of events E , E ′ ∈Σ imposes, or rather requires, a linear
order µE ,E ′ on the set of probability measures Π ⊂ ∆. Equivalently, for {π(E ) |π ∈Π} and
{π(E ′) |π ∈Π}, there exists an nondecreasing ζ such that π(E ) = ζ(π(E ′)). Ambiguity about
an event E , the uncertainty about its probability, is described by the variation inπ (E ) . Am-
biguities about two belief comonotone events are qualitatively similar in the sense that they
are described by two comonotone variables: when one variable has a relatively high real-
ization, so does the other.20
That ambiguity affects two belief comonotone events in a qualitatively similar way is evi-
dent in the manner they are viewed by preferences not neutral to ambiguity: they cannot
be used to mutually hedge ambiguity. Fix two acts and consider DMs indifferent between
them. A key distinguishing feature of DMs not neutral to ambiguity is that they are not indif-
ferent between one of these acts and a strategy that randomly mixes between the the acts,
since such mixing may hedge ambiguity. The next proposition shows that belief comono-
tonicity (onΠ) of a pair of events is characterized, in preference terms, by the property that
bets on these events will be considered to offer no mutual hedging possibilities by every
α-MEU DM with belief Π′ ⊆Π.
Proposition 5.1. FixΠ, a compact, convex subset of∆. Let x , y ∈ X , with x > y . Let E1, E2 ∈Σ.
The following are equivalent:
(i) The pair of events E1, E2 is belief comonotone on Π.
(ii) For each compact, convex Π′ ⊆Π, and λ ∈ [0, 1], if ∈P MU1,Π′ , z ∈ X , x (E1) y ∼ z (E2) y ,
then x (E1) y ∼ z (E2) y ∼ fλ where fλ ∈F is an act which pays according to x (E1) y or z (E2) y
with probabilities λ and 1−λ respectively.
20One may construct examples of belief comonotone events with even a state space containing as few as




⊂ [0, 1] , p 6= q ,π ({s2}) = kπ ({s1}) , with k q ≤ 1−q . Then {s1} and
{s2} are belief comonotone and the set of probabilities on S is centrally symmetric.
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This result may be contrasted with Theorem 2 of Klibanoff (2001) which, in our language
establishes, that mixing between indifferent acts never generates a strictly preferred act for
any MEU preference with given u ∈U1, if and only if there exist a ≥ 0 and b ∈R such that
either u ( f (s )) = a u (g (s ))+b or u (g (s )) = a u ( f (s ))+b . Klibanoff’s condition translated into
the events case covered in Proposition 5.1 is extremely restrictive—it implies the events are
identical (providing only that u is strictly nondecreasing). Note the important distinction
that Klibanoff’s result restricts preferences by fixing a u ∈ U1 but allowing any compact
convex Π ∈∆, whereas we fix Π but admit any u ∈U1.
Remark 5.1. Belief comonotonicity has a related preference implication for smooth ambi-
guity preferences: Let E , E ′ ∈ Σ be belief comonotone on suppµ. Suppose E ′′ ∈ Σ, satisfies
x E ′y ∼ x E ′′y for all ambiguity averse ∈P SU1,µ, and for some x , y ∈ X . Then, for all ambi-

















,λ ∈ [0, 1] . (16)
Whereas Proposition 5.1 shows that belief comonotone events eliminate hedging pos-
sibilities for preferences inP MU1,Π, Remark 5.1 shows that while hedging possibilities are not
necessarily eliminated for preferences inP SU1,µ, they are minimized.
5.1.2 Characterizing m.a.(II) events
The main role of belief comonotonicity is in relating acts to events, as will become clear.
However, it also leads to a relatively strong conclusion in the case of m.a.(II) events: the




essentially, the same condition—that the probability of the more ambiguous event is more
elastic. A notable feature of the condition is that the second order belief,µ, does not matter
beyond the determination of its support.
Proposition 5.2. Either let P =P SU1,µ or, let P =P
M
U1,Π
, where Π is compact, convex. Sup-
pose, the pair of events E , E ′ is belief comonotone, on suppµ in the caseP =P SU1,µ, and on
Π in the caseP =P MU1,Π. Then, in the following, (i) is equivalent to (iii), and (ii) is equivalent
to (iii):
(i) In the P =P MU1,Π case: there is an elasticity reducing function η : Π(E )→ [0, 1] such
that π(E ′) =η(π(E )) on Π.
(ii) In theP SU1,µ case: there is an elasticity reducing function η : suppµ→ [0, 1] such that
π(E ′) =η(π(E )) almost everywhere on suppµ.
(iii) E is a (P )-more ambiguous (II) event than E ′.
Note the difference between the characterizing condition (ii) here and that in Proposi-
tion 3.4. Here, π(E ′) is the same as η(π(E )), a.e., whereas in the other propositionπ(E ′) and
η(π(E )) have the same distribution, under µ. Remark 3.1 explains the intuition underlying
the result.
5.2 When acts are belief comonotone
It is not only more compelling conceptually but also likely to be more useful in applications
to have characterizations of more ambiguous acts which are not inextricably linked to the
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DM’s attitude to risk, i.e., which are independent of the particular u ∈U1 entering the de-
cision makers preference representation. Of course, in general, we can simply require the
characterizing conditions in propositions in the preceding subsection to hold for all u ∈U1,
as is done in Proposition 4.4, for instance. However, by specializing to the case of acts which
satisfy a natural extension of the idea of belief comonotonicity of events, much more sim-
ple, powerful characterizations obtain than are available in the general case. These charac-
terizations are expressed in terms which satisfy the criterion of not being linked to attitudes
to risk.
5.2.1 Definition and relation to belief comonotonicity of events
First, we extend the notion of belief comonotonicity to acts. Bets on events are binary acts,
hence so long as utility is nondecreasing, choice of a particular utility would not affect the
ordering over Π. In the case of general acts, however, the utility function matters for how
the set Π is ordered. Extending the notion to acts is essentially a matter of incorporating
this extra consideration.
Definition 5.2. Given a class of utilities U , a collection of acts A ⊂F is belief comonotone
onΠ⊂∆ if Π can be placed in linear order µU such that for eachπ1,π2 ∈Π,π1 µU π2 implies
for each u ∈U ˆ
S
u ( f )dπ1 ≤
ˆ
S
u ( f )dπ2 for each act f ∈ A. (17)
A collection of bets on different events combine to form simple acts. Conversely, we will
find it useful to decompose acts into a collection of bets on events. In the following propo-
sition, we characterize the relation between belief comonotonicity of events and acts by
showing that belief comonotone acts may be decomposed into belief comonotone events.
Notation. Given f ∈ F̂ , let E fx ≡

s ∈ S : f (s )≤ x
	
, x ∈ X , denote the event such that the
outcomes under f are worse than x ; a worse-outcome event.
Proposition 5.3. Let f , g ∈ F̂ . Fix a set Π⊂∆. The following are equivalent:
(i) Each pair of events (E hx , E
h ′
x ′ ), h , h
′ ∈ { f , g }, x , x ′ ∈ X is belief comonotone on Π.
(ii) The pair of acts f , g is belief comonotone on Π for the class of utilities U1.
The proposition shows, for the class of nondecreasing utilities, belief comonotonicity
of a pair of acts is equivalent to belief comonotonicity of worse-outcome events under the
acts. Taken together with Proposition 5.1 (and Remark 5.1), this shows that if two acts are
belief comonotone their respective worse-outcome events are affected by ambiguity in a
qualitatively similar way, in that DMs behave as if such events do not combine to hedge
ambiguity well.
Remark 5.2. A pair f , g ∈ F̂ is belief comonotone on Π given u ∈ U1, if and only if the
families of probability distributions {P fπ |π ∈ Π} and {P
g
π |π ∈ Π} are ordered similarly by
(first-order) stochastic dominance.
5.2.2 Relating more ambiguous acts to more ambiguous events
Suppose that the collection of events that combine to form a particular act is more am-
biguous than those that do the same for another act. It seems natural to ask, under what
condition is this necessary and sufficient to make the first act more ambiguous than the
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second act? More precisely, is there a condition which ensures that f is more ambiguous
than g if and only if every worse-outcome event under f , E fx , is more ambiguous than E
g
x ?
The next proposition answers the question for the case of m.a.(I).
Proposition 5.4. Either let P =P SU1,µ or, let P =P
M
U1,Π
, where Π is compact, convex and
centrally symmetric. Furthermore, given the class of utilities in U1, suppose that in the case
P =P SU1,µ the pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂ is belief comonotone on suppµ and in the caseP =P
M
U1,Π
is belief comonotone on Π. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) For each x ∈ X , E fx is a (P )-m .a (I ) event than E
g
x ;
(ii) f is (P )-m .a (I ) than g .
Remark 5.3. Inspection of the proof will reveal immediately that f is a (P SU1,µ)-m .a .(I ) act
than g implies for each x ∈ X , E fx is a (P
S
U1,µ
)-m .a .(I ) event than E fx , for any pair of acts f , g ,
not necessarily ones that are belief comonotone. The same can be shown forP =P MU1,Π.
For an intuition behind the preceding result consider the following. Suppose for each









comonotonicity these fluctuations are aligned across the different values of x —they res-
onate. This resonance ensures that greater fluctuation at the individual event level trans-
lates to greater fluctuation at the aggregate level, i.e., at the level of the act f . Without belief
comonotonicity. as π ranges on Π, the fluctuations at the level of individual events would
be out of sync and therefore may mutually hedge each other. Hence, greater fluctuation
at the individual event level may not necessarily aggregate into a greater fluctuation at the
act level. This facilitating role of belief comonotonicity is quite general: it applies to both
preference classesP MU1,Π andP
S
U1,µ
. We now turn to the case of more ambiguous (II).
Proposition 5.5. Suppose suppµ=Π is compact convex and given the class of utilities U1 the





(i) For each x ∈ J , E fx is a (P )-m.a.(II) event than E
g
x . Also, for every ∈ P , for each
distinct v, w ∈ J , ∃ ∗,∗∗∈ P each of which is either more or less ambiguity averse than ,









w ∗∗ v (E fx )w .
(ii) f is a (P )-m .a .(I I ) act than g . Also, for every ∈ P , ∃ ∗,∗∗∈ P each of which is
either more or less ambiguity averse than , such that f ∗ g and g ∗∗ f .
Remark 5.4. Condition (i) in Proposition 5.5 is akin to E fx being more ambiguous than E
g
x
in the sense of the Gul and Pesendorfer (2014). See the discussion in Section 1.
Hence, given a qualification, belief comonotonicity also enables the m.a.(II) relation be-
tween worse outcome events to aggregate to the corresponding m.a.(II) relation between
acts. The qualification (in condition (i)) is that neither is E fx more likely than E
g
x for every
π ∈ Π, nor is it less likely than E gx for every π ∈ Π. Hence, we may say, given Π, that E
f
x is
neither unambiguously more, nor unambiguously less, likely than E gx . The single crossing
property, fundamental to m.a.(II), does not aggregate, in general: a convex combination
of two functions, each of which satisfies single crossing, does not generally satisfy single
crossing. The role of the qualification is that it allows single crossing to be preserved in
the aggregate, in this context. An analogous qualification applies to condition (ii): that
it is not the case there is complete agreement in the preference class, irrespective of am-
biguity attitude, as to which of the two acts being compared is preferred. Hence, neither
act stochastically dominates the other for all π ∈ Π, and so again, in this sense, neither
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act is unambiguously preferred to the other. Thus, the qualification restricts attention to
cases where ambiguity attitude can affect the direction of preference between the pair of
events/acts being compared, given beliefs.
The rest of this subsection presents characterizations of more ambiguous acts for each
of the two preference families given belief comonotonicity. The characterizations are sim-
ple and powerful in that they do not refer to particular utilities; only to distribution(s) over
outcomes. The clue to understanding how these obtain is in the two results just presented.
In general, characterizations of more ambiguous involve reference to particular utilities
since the notion is based on more ambiguity averse, a relation which orders preferences
only when they share the same risk attitude (Remark 2.1). In the case of events though, be-
cause we require (by definition) the more ambiguous property to hold for an entire range
of binary acts (outcomes ranging over an arbitrary interval on the real line) obtaining char-
acterizations by restricting to a particular (non-constant) utility function is as general as
leaving the utility unrestricted. Thus, characterization of more ambiguous events do not
refer to particular utilities. Belief comonotonicity is the condition under which more am-
biguity for events aggregates up to acts. Hence, that is also the condition under which the
characterizations of acts don’t involve risk attitudes.
5.2.3 Characterizing m.a.(I) acts
If, for the class of utilities U1, a pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂ is belief comonotone on Π ⊂ ∆, then
Π admits a parameterization in the real line, a point we now elaborate. By Remark 5.2,
{P fπ |π ∈ Π} and {P
g












g dπ′ implies P gπ = P
g
π′ . Further-











π′ in which case, since the
acts f , g have identical distributions of outcomes whetherπ orπ′ obtains,π andπ′ may be
classed as equivalent. This means it is admissible to carry out the following reparameteri-
zation of Π. Allowing each π ∈ Π to be represented as ρ(π), where ρ(π) =
´ f +g
2 dπ, we can
define two derived probability measures on R, one for each class of preferencesP SU1,µ and
P MU1,Π, as follows.




. Hence, the probability
measure P f ,µ on (X ×∆,BX×B∆)defined in equation (5) may be replaced by the probability
measure P f ,bµ on (X ×R,BX ×BR) defined by P f ,bµ(B ×D ) = P f ,µ(B × ρ−1(D )), B ∈ BX ,
D ∈ BR. Where, noting P fπ (B ) is constant on ρ
−1(r ), and choosing π(r ) as any selection
from ρ−1(r ), we have
P f ,bµ(B ×D ) =
ˆ
D
P fπ(r ) (B )d bµ(r ), B ∈BX , D ∈BR. (18)
Similarly for P g ,bµ. Note, P f ,bµ has two marginal probability measures: one on outcomes




π (B )dµ, B ∈ BX and the other is the measure bµ defined on
(R,BR), representing belief.
For preferences in P MU1,Π, although the DM’s preference does not specify a probability
distribution over ∆, for the purposes of comparison with the P SU1,µ case, we nevertheless
find it convenient to construct such a distribution. To this end, note the centrally symmet-




21This is a standard result. See, e.g., Theorem 1.2.9 in Müller and Stoyan (2002).
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and let Òm (reminiscent of the M inP MU1,Π) be uniform on this pair. SinceΠ is centrally sym-
metric, π(r ),π(r )may be selected so that π(r )+π(r )2 =π
∗, with this selection we define
P f ,Òm (B ×D ) =
ˆ
D
P fπ(r ) (B )d Òm (r ), B ∈BX , D ∈BR.
Note, in particular, that the marginal distribution of outcomes is P fπ∗ (B ) . This follows from
the mixture linearity of P fπ (B ) inπ, which we observed holds whenΠ is convex. The proba-
bility measures P f ,bµ, P f ,Òm on (X ×R,BX ×BR)have associated distribution functions which
we economize on notation by writing
P f ,bµ(x , p i )≡ P f ,bµ
 





P fπ(r ) (x )d bµ(r ), (x , p i ) ∈R
2.
Similarly for P f ,Òm .
α-MEU preferences. As a corollary of Propositions 5.4 and 3.1 we have the following char-









x ∈ X .
Proposition 5.6. LetΠ be compact, convex and centrally symmetric with centerπ?. Suppose
the pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂ is belief comonotone on Π for the class of utilities U1. The following
are equivalent:




-more ambiguous (I) act than g ;
(ii)P fπ?(B ) = P
g
π?(B ), B ∈BX , and





P fπ (x ) |π ∈Π
	
, x ∈R. (19)
(iii) The distributions P f ,Òm and P g ,Òm have identical marginal distributions and
P f ,Òm (x , p i )≥ P g ,Òm (x , p i ) on R2.
Smooth ambiguity preferences. Given a class of smooth ambiguity preferences P SU1,µ,
and acts f , g ∈ F̂ , P f ,bµ and P g ,bµ have marginal probability measures over outcomes which
represent the beliefs of the ambiguity neutral elements ofP SU1,µ and will be equal if these el-
ements are indifferent between the two acts. We have already noted that P f ,bµ and P g ,bµ also
have the other marginal, bµ, in common. Hence, P g ,bµ and P f ,bµ share the same marginals.
From Proposition 5.4, f is a (P )-more ambiguous (I) act than g if and only if for each
x ∈ X , E fx is a (P )-m .a (I ) event than E
g
x . Hence, for each x ∈ X , π(E
f
x ) = P
f
π (x ) is ‘riskier’
than π(E gx ) = P
g
π (x ), under the probability measure µ in the sense that for all concave ϕ,´
ϕ(P fπ (x ))dµ ≤
´
ϕ(P gπ (x ))dµ. Recall the classic majorization result of Hardy, Littlewood,












i=1 yi . A natural generalization (Theorem 250 of Hardy, Littlewood,
and Pólya (1952)) applicable to our question isˆ
(−∞,z ]
P fπ(r )(x )d bµ(r )≥
ˆ
(−∞,z ]
P gπ(r )(x )d bµ(r ), x ∈ X , z ∈R.
These observations lead to the following characterization.
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Proposition 5.7. Suppose the pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂ is belief comonotone on suppµ for the
class of utilities U1. Then, the following are equivalent:




-more ambiguous (I) act than g ;
(ii) The distributions P f ,bµ and P g ,bµ have identical marginals and
P f ,bµ(x , p i )≥ P g ,bµ(x , p i ) on X ×R. (20)
The fact that f m.a.(I) g implies P g ,bµ and P f ,bµ have the same marginals means the rela-
tion m.a.(I) can be represented by a comparison of the copulas22 of P g ,bµ and P f ,bµ. A copula
corresponding to P f ,bµ for act f is a function C f ,bµ : [0, 1]2→ [0, 1] satisfying
C f ,bµ(P f ,bµ(x ,∞), P f ,bµ(∞, p i )) = P f ,bµ(x , p i ).
Similarly for act g . Hence, condition (ii) of the proposition can equivalently be stated as:
condition (14) together with
C f ,bµ ≥C g ,bµ on [0, 1]2. (21)
This condition is discussed in the statistics literature in many places. For instance, Tchen
(1980) calls it concordance. This is very natural in our context since it implies, for instance,
that conditioning on the “event” {π′ ∈ ∆ | π′ µU1 π} for some given π ∈ Π makes the con-
ditional distribution of outcomes worse by first-order stochastic dominance for the more
ambiguous act than the less ambiguous act. Therefore, a variation in π affects the proba-
bility distribution on outcomes more strongly in the case of the more ambiguous act. An
exactly analogous interpretation applies to condition (iii) in Proposition 5.6 so the charac-
terizations for both preference classes can be interpreted in a unified way via a condition
on copulas.
Finally, before moving on to characterize m.a.(II) acts it will be convenient to note an
alternative way of expressing the conditions of Proposition 5.6, which also provides an in-
tuitive sufficient condition for Proposition 5.7.









whenever π1,π2 ∈ Π, π1 µU1 π2. Equivalently,
´
ud P fπ (x )−
´
ud P gπ (x ) is increasing in µU1
order on Π for all u ∈U1. If Π is compact, convex and centrally symmetric, and condition
(12) holds, then condition (22) is equivalent to condition (ii) of Proposition 5.6. Moreover,
let Π = suppµ and suppose the distributions P f ,bµ and P g ,bµ have identical marginals, then
condition (22) implies (20) in Proposition 5.7.
Our next example, shows how Proposition 5.7 can be applied to explain a debated pref-
erence pattern in Machina’s “reflection” example (Machina (2009)).
Example 5.1. We follow Nau’s reformulation of the example (Nau (2014)), where he discusses
the acts fk , k = 1, 2, 3, 4, shown in Table 1, with payoffs contingent on states smn , m = 1, 2,
n = 1, 2.23 All that is objectively known about probabilities is that the events {s11, s12} and
{s21, s22} each occur with a probability equal to 0.5. Finally, let y > x > 0.
22The copula C of a random vector (Z1, Z2) with cdf FZ1,Z2 (z1, z2) and marginal cdfs FZ1 (z1), FZ2 (z2) satisfies
FZ1,Z2 (z1, z2) = C (FZ1 (z1), FZ2 (z2)). By Sklar’s theorem (Sklar (1959)), the copula is unique if the marginal dis-
tributions are atomless. Otherwise the copula is uniquely defined at points of continuity of the marginal
distributions.
23The act fk is called fk+4 in Nau (2014), k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Table 1: The acts
s11 s12 s21 s22
f1 y x + y y 0
f2 y y x + y 0
f3 0 x + y y y
f4 0 y x + y y
s11 s12 s21 s22
π1 0.5 0 0 0.5
π2 0 0.5 0 0.5
π3 0.5 0 0.5 0
π4 0 0.5 0.5 0
Table 2: Belief on the state space
Recent literature (e.g., Baillon, L’Haridon, and Placido, 2011) has seen quite an intense
debate about about what would be “natural” preferences of ambiguity averse DMs for the
pairs f1, f2 and f3, f4. Clearly, from the symmetry, the ranking between f1 and f2 should be
the same as (or “reflected in”) that between f4 and f3; the debate is about the rank of f1 with
respect to f2. The opposing contentions as to which pair of acts is more "exposed to ambi-
guity" are argued at an intuitive level without reference to a set of formal, general principles
defining when to consider an act more exposed to ambiguity. The discussion here will give
a justification for the preference pattern f1  f2 and f3 ≺ f4, based on the principles of more
ambiguous (I).
To simplify the exposition and analysis, we consider DMs with beliefs given byΠ= {πi }4i=1




is belief comonotone on Π for increasing utilities, with π1 µU1 π2 µU1 π3 µU1 π4. One may
verify, using Table 3, that P f2,µ ≥ P f1,µ and that the marginals are identical.24 Hence, by
Proposition 5.7, we have that for the class of smooth ambiguity preferences with increasing
u and φ, and µ as above, f2 is more ambiguous (I) than f1. Notice, conditioning on the
“event” Z (π2) =

π′ ∈Π |π′ µU1 π2
	
, the conditional (cumulative) distribution on outcomes
induced by fk , k = 1, 2, is shown in the matrix corresponding to fk in Table 3 by dividing the
numbers in the column forπ2 byµ (Z (π2)) = 1/2. We see the conditional distribution induced
by f2 is (strictly) worse than that induced by f1, by first-order stochastic dominance. Hence,
in a sense, the distributions conditional on Z (π2) and Z (π3) induced by f2 are further apart
than those induced by f1. Thus the insight our theory and the characterization brings to this
debate is that a variation inπ affects the probability distributions on outcomes more strongly
in the case of f2, the more ambiguous act.
5.2.4 Characterizing m.a.(II) acts
α-MEU and smooth ambiguity As in Proposition 5.2, the characterizing condition for





is also belief comonotone on Π for increasing utilities, but with π1 µU1 π3 µU1 π2 µU1 π4.
One may similarly verify P f3,µ ≥ P f4,µ, so that f3 is more ambiguous (I) than f4.
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f1
π1 π2 π3 π4
0 1/8 1/4 1/4 1/4
y 1/4 3/8 5/8 3/4
x + y 1/4 4/8 3/4 1
f2
π1 π2 π3 π4
0 1/8 1/4 1/4 1/4
y 1/4 4/8 5/8 3/4
x + y 1/4 4/8 3/4 1
Table 3: Joint distributions, P fk ,µ, for acts f1 and f2.
Proposition 5.8. Suppose suppµ=Π is compact, convex and that given the class of utilities
U1, the pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂J is belief comonotone on Π. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) f is a (P SU1,µ)−m .a .(I I ) act than g ;
(ii) f is a (P MU1,Π)−m .a .(I I ) act than g .




≤ |J |, there exist λ1,λ2 ≥ 0, λ1+λ2 = 1
such that for all x ∈ J ,
λ1(1−P f +pπ1 (x ))+λ2P
f +p
π2




It follows from Proposition 5.5 that for condition (iii) to obtain it is sufficient that P fπ1 is
stochastically dominated by P gπ1 and P
g
π2
is stochastically dominated by P fπ2 . This gives us a
way of constructing a pair of acts related by m.a.(II) that works for bothα-MEU and smooth
ambiguity and is independent of u ∈ U1. Evidently, in this case, the distribution of out-
comes under act f is, in a very strong way, more affected by the change from π1 to π2 than
is the distribution of outcomes under act g .
Remark 5.6. The condition, π1,π2 ∈ Π and π1 µU1 π2 implies P
f
π2




P gπ1(x ) for all x ∈ X , is sufficient for condition (iii) of Proposition 5.8.
Remark 5.7. The proof of Proposition 5.8 shows that condition (iii) implies (i) without the
requirement of convexity of suppµ.
6 Illustrative applications
We next give an illustrative analysis of a portfolio choice question involving one sure and
one uncertain asset and finally of a consumption-saving decision problem where the re-
turn from saving is uncertain. The financial instruments are modeled explicitly as lotteries
on outcomes induced by the agent’s subjective belief. The instrument with certain return is
a degenerate lottery. The instrument with uncertain return is modeled as a set of lotteries,
with an associated second order belief if such a belief is admitted by the agent’s preferences.
The question addressed is the comparative static of the agent’s portfolio decision when a
given uncertain instrument is replaced by one which is more ambiguous. Since the char-
acterizations of more ambiguous are simply conditions on lotteries (on outcomes), they
immediately suggest the way the question may be formulated for analysis.
Our theory has directly addressed the question of more ambiguous relations on acts and
on events, but not on beliefs. However, it is also natural to ask, for instance, how the opti-
mal portfolio choice is affected if the agent’s belief becomes more ambiguous? Consider the
analogous question in a model with a subjective expected utility agent. How is the optimal
portfolio choice affected if the agent’s subjective belief becomes more risky? If we take “sub-
jective belief” to mean the agent’s (prior) belief on the state space, the question appears
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to be ill posed since, generally, the state space is not ordered in the way the outcome space
is: a given change in the prior may cause the distribution of outcomes induced by one act
f to become riskier while simultaneously causing the distribution of outcomes induced by
another act g to become less risky. A better posed question, therefore, is to ask how the
optimal choice is affected if the agent’s subjective belief (on states) changes such that the
probability distribution on outcomes induced by the uncertain asset is made riskier? The
answer to this question is evidently the same as the answer to the question as to how op-
timal portfolio weights change going from one uncertain asset f to a different but riskier
asset g , holding subjective belief constant. Thus, put this way, we can answer the question
on the basis of the theory of increasing risk, formulated entirely in terms of (the induced)
lotteries as, e.g., in Rothschild and Stiglitz.
Back to ambiguity, consider the comparative static exercise for, say, an α-MEU agent
with belief Π, of replacing one asset f with a more ambiguous asset g with corresponding
induced sets of distributions (P fπ )π∈Π and (P
g
π )π∈Π. As in the SEU case, this exercise may be
reinterpreted as showing the comparative static effect of a change in belief, from Π to Π′,
such that the induced set of distributions of outcomes of a given (uncertain) asset changes
from (P fπ )π∈Π to (P
f
π )π∈Π′ = (P
g
π )π∈Π. That is, the set of distributions induced by the belief
change is the same as that of a more ambiguous asset under unchanged belief and hence
the analysis of this paper applies.
From this perspective, our representations in terms of stochastic kernels are particularly
useful in the case of m.a.(I). Suppose, for instance, that there is a stochastic kernel from
(∆,B∆) to itself which maps the centrally symmetric set Π into the centrally symmetric set
Π′. Then, since Π(E ) ⊂ Π′(E ) for all E ∈ Σ,we have by Proposition 3.1 if for some Π(E ′) =
Π′(E ), E is m.a.(I) E ′. There is, therefore, for α-MEU, a clear sense in which the action of
the stochastic kernel makes all events more ambiguous (I). With modification, the same
observation holds for smooth ambiguity preferences and it holds for acts as well as events.
The perspective of looking at the question in terms of changes in (induced) sets of lotter-
ies may also be fruitfully applied to questions involving m.a.(II) comparisons. The idea of
m.a.(II) extends naturally and straightforwardly to a model of "objective ambiguity," where
we consider preferences over given sets of lotteries, abstracting away from a framework of
a state space, acts and subjective beliefs. Two prominent examples of such preferences are
those considered in Olszewski (2007) and in Ahn (2008). For such a model of preferences,
given two sets of lotteries,L f andLg , we sayL f is a more ambiguous set of lotteries than
Lg if the more ambiguity averse preference requires more compensation to give upLg for
L f . One may think of Olszewski’s and Ahn’s preferences as presenting objective analogs of,
respectively, the α-MEU, and smooth ambiguity, in much the same way as von Neuman-
Morgenstern theory stands in relation to SEU. Characterizations of the more ambiguous for
these, respective, classes of preferences follow as corollaries of Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 (see
Appendix A.5 for details). For instance, sets of lotteries ordered by set inclusion is also so
ordered by this notion of more ambiguous for Olszewski’s class preferences. Appendix A.5
also gives an analog of Proposition 5.8 which (following Remark 5.6) allows one to construct
a sufficient condition on a pair of sets of lotteries under which one is a more ambiguous set
of lotteries than another for both Olszewski’s and Ahn’s preferences and all increasing util-
ities.
Therefore, we may rephrase the comparative static question of more ambiguous for-
mally in terms of direct comparison of (induced) sets of lotteries and answer the question
on the basis of the ideas of m.a.(I) and m.a.(II). This is analogous to appealing to the the-
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ory of riskier lotteries to answer comparative questions involving choices becoming riskier
owing to implicit changes in subjective beliefs.
6.1 Comparative statics of portfolio choice with more ambiguous (I)
A natural test-bed for the applicability of the more ambiguous characterizations is the stan-
dard one risky asset one safe asset portfolio problem analyzed by Arrow (1965). In our set-
ting, the uncertain asset is one whose return embodies not only risk, but also ambiguity.
The safe asset has neither risk nor ambiguity.
Let an act f1 = f ∈ cF correspond to investing wholly in the uncertain asset and the
constant act f0 ∈ cF , represent investing wholly in the safe asset. The DM’s objective is to
select a portfolio shareθ for the uncertain asset, in order to maximize the ex ante evaluation
of her final wealth position. If initial wealth is w0, the final wealth is determined by w1 =
w0(θ f1 + (1−θ ) f0). We assume no short-selling and that w1(s ) ∈ X for all s ∈ S , 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.









u (θ x )d P fπ (x )+ (1−α)maxπ∈Π
ˆ
X
u (θ x )d P fπ (x )

, (24)






















denote, respectively, the solution to each program.
We suppose u is strictly concave in both cases, and thatφ is strictly concave in the second.
It follows that program (25) is concave in θ ∈R and strictly so in non-degenerate cases. The
presence of the maxπ∈Π operator in program (24) means that concavity is not in general
assured. However, the belief comonotonicity condition stated in Proposition 6.1 implies
that the program is concave. Hence, under these conditions, the maxima in both programs
are uniquely attained.
We do not aim here to mirror the exhaustive study of the portfolio comparative stat-
ics problem which has been carried out for risk with expected utility preferences.25 It is,
however, convenient to adopt an assumption on preferences motivated by that literature.
It is known for expected utility DMs that a first-order stochastic dominance improvement
in the return of the risky asset will never lead to a smaller portfolio share of the risky asset
only if the DM’s preferences satisfies auxiliary conditions sufficient to imply that in terms
of the normalized utility, (x ,θ ) 7→ u (θ x ) is supermodular on [0, 1]×X . It suffices if the DM’s
utility (not necessarily normalized) has a coefficient of relative risk aversion bounded be-
low unity.26 Our first result, for α-MEU preferences, gives a suite of conditions sufficient
to ensure that the portfolio share of the uncertain asset does not increase as we move to a
more ambiguous (I) uncertain asset.
Proposition 6.1. LetP =P MU1,Π, where Π is a compact, convex centrally symmetric subset of
∆. Suppose given U1, the pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂ is belief comonotone onΠ. Suppose u is strictly
25See, e.g., Gollier (2011) for a study of the comparative statics of more ambiguity averse in the standard
portfolio choice problem.
26These and other conditions are comprehensively discussed in Sections 4.5 and 7.2 of Gollier (2001).
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concave and for the normalized utility, (x ,θ ) 7→ u (θ x ) is supermodular and that α ≥ 0.5. If
act f is (P )-more ambiguous (I) than act g then θ ∗
 




(Π,α, u ) ; g

.
The next proposition finds sufficient conditions for the comparative static to hold for
smooth ambiguity preferences. The key conditions are similar to those invoked for the re-
sult for α-MEU. However, the proof is more delicate and requires auxiliary assumptions on
φ, specifically −φ′′/φ′ is nonincreasing.
Proposition 6.2. Let P = P SU1,µ and suppose given U1, the pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂ is belief
comonotone on suppµ. Suppose u strictly concave and for the normalized utility, (x ,θ ) 7→
u (θ x ) is supermodular and that φ is concave and such that −φ
′′
φ′ is nonincreasing. If act f














Remark 6.1. An examination of the proof will show that an alternative to the condition that
−φ′′
φ′ is nonincreasing, is
−φ′′
φ′ is nondecreasing withφ
′′′ ≤ 0. This admits the class of quadratic
φ.
6.2 Comparative statics of savings with m.a.(II)
To illustrate comparative statics using m.a.(II), we consider the following simple savings
problem. The agent lives for two periods, has initial known wealth y1 and will receive un-
certain income Y2 in period 2 generated by an act f +a ∈ F̂ . A DM withα-MEU preferences,
has utility given by









If the DM has smooth ambiguity preferences, the utility is












The problem is to choose savings a ∈R to maximize (26) or (27). We are interested in inves-
tigating the impact on savings of a compensated increase in uncertainty, specifically when
g is replaced by f , with f (P )-m .a .(I I ) g , while maintaining the DM’s standard of living
at the initial level of savings. Hence, we compare the cases, according to which preference
family applies, in which f satisfies:
V f ,uM (a
g






M ∈ arg maxa∈R V
g ,u
M (a ), (28)
V f ,uS (a
g






S ∈ arg maxa∈R V
g ,u
S (a ). (29)
The assumptions in the following proposition will imply that argmax
a∈R
V f ,uM (a )and argmax
a∈R
V f ,uS (a )
are uniquely attained.
Proposition 6.3. Suppose u ∈U1 is concave and CARA.
(a) LetΠbe convex compact. Suppose the pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂ is belief comonotone onΠ⊂




−more ambiguous (II) than g . Then arg maxa∈RV
f ,u










−more ambiguous (II) than g . Suppose φ is concave and −φ′′/φ′ is decreasing
concave. Then arg maxa∈RV
f ,u
S (a )≤ arg maxa∈RV
g ,u
S (a ).
The reason the increasing ambiguity leaves savings unchanged for preferences inP MU1,Π,
is because with CARA preferences the marginal utility u ′ is an affine transformation of u .
Together with belief comonotonicity, compensation implies the first-order condition and
therefore optimal savings is unchanged. For preferences in P SU1,µ, the situation is more
complicated. The marginal utility enters the first-order condition after being weighted by
φ′ so there is an interaction created by ambiguity aversion which generally affects savings.
7 Concluding remarks
The characterizations of more ambiguous (I) and (II) events make precise two senses in
which the event probability of a more ambiguous events varies more as π, the probability
measure on the state space, varies. The characterizations of more ambiguous acts demon-
strated the sense in which an expected utility evaluation of a more ambiguous act is more
sensitive to which specificπ is applied in computing the expectation. In the sense the word
was used in the introduction, it is less robust to ambiguity.
An important auxiliary finding was in characterizing the central role of belief comono-
tonicity. It is a natural restriction because it rules out the ’hedging’, which otherwise un-
dermines the intuitive connection between more ambiguity of an act and more ambiguity
of its worse-outcome events. The role it plays works quite generally; it is neither restricted
to a particular family of preferences and nor to one particular notion of more ambiguous.
Finally, our discussion and the illustrative applications in Section 6, indicated that the
ideas and characterizations may be used to formulate questions involving more ambiguous
in a variety of applied contexts.
Apart from applications, an immediate, obvious direction for future research suggested
by the analyses here is towards obtaining characterizations for classes of preferences be-
yond α-MEU and Smooth Ambiguity. The characterization strategy employed in the paper
should extend to preference classes where representations in a particular class share an
evident, common, belief element while allowing for parametric variation in risk and am-
biguity attitudes. For instance, a class of Variational Preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci,
and Rustichini (2006)) or of Vector Expected Utility (VEU) (Siniscalchi (2009)) with a given
baseline prior belief.27 Implementing more ambiguous (I) would require, additionally, a
class which includes a sub-class of ambiguity neutral preferences. To illustrate the feasi-
bility of extending our characterization strategy to such classes, in Appendix A.6 we char-
acterize more ambiguous (I) events for the class of ambiguity averse VEU preferences with
a given, common, baseline prior P , and u ∈U1. This class is also a sub-class of Variational
preferences.
27Another example is the “Contraction” preferences model of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
It should be possible to obtain characterization for this case by mimicking the proof strategies for theα-MEU
case and characterizations obtained would be very analogous.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of results in Section 3
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3.1]
Let u ∈ U1. Since Π(E ) is a compact interval and

u (x )π(E ) +u (y )(1−π(E ))

is linear
in π(E ), minπ∈Π





u (x )π(E ) +u (y )(1−π(E ))

are at-
tained at the two extreme points of Π(E ). For an ambiguity neutral element of the prefer-
ence class with α= 12 , u ∈U1, this implies














u (x )π(E ) +u (y )(1−π(E ))





















= u (x ) (π?(E ))+u (y )(1−π∗(E )).
Similarly, VΠ, 12 ,u (x E
′y ) = u (x ) (π?(E ′)) + u (y )(1 − π?(E ′)). This establishes that if π?(E ) =
π?(E ′) all ambiguity elements of the preference class P MU1,Π are indifferent between x E y
and x E ′y . Choosing x , y ∈ X and u ∈U1 such that u (x ) 6= u (y ) shows the condition also to
be necessary.
Using again the fact that Π(E ) and Π(E ′) are compact intervals, it follows that the con-
dition Π(E ) ⊂ Π(E ′) is equivalent to the condition minΠ(E ) ≤ minΠ(E ′) ≤ maxΠ(E ′) ≤
maxΠ(E ). Using this, it is straightforward to show (givenπ?(E ) =π?(E ′)) that all preferences
in the class P which are more ambiguity averse than than the ambiguity neutral element
 
Π, 12 , u

, that is elements ofP with (Π,α, u ) , α≥ 12 , weakly prefer x E ′y to x E y .
To see this, suppose u (x )> u (y ), α> 12 , then
VΠ,α,u (x E y ) =α



















Similarly, for E ′. Since, VΠ, 12 ,u (x E y ) =VΠ, 12 ,u ((x E
′y ), it follows that VΠ,α,u (x E y )<VΠ,α,u (x E ′y )
if and only if ((maxΠ(E )−minΠ(E ))< (maxΠ(E ′)−minΠ(E ′))) . If u (x ) < u (y ), the proof
proceeds in the same way, u (x ) = u (y ) is trivial. Likewise all preferences with α< 12 weakly
prefer x E y to x E ′y . This establishes the equivalence of conditions (i) and (ii) of the propo-
sition.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3.2]
Let u ∈U1, x , y ∈ X . Setting a = u (y ), b = u (x )−u (y ), we can write






























for all concave nondecreasingφ : u (X )→R. The inequality is required to hold with equality
whenφ is affine, corresponding to the case of ambiguity neutral preferences. If b = 0, there
is nothing to prove, hence suppose b > 0 (b < 0 leads to an equivalent argument). Let
A = {z ∈R | a + b z ∈ u (X )} 6= ;. The condition can be stated equivalently as:
∑













for all nondecreasing concave φ : A → R. Equivalently,
∑
ϕ (πi (E ))µi ≥
∑
ϕ (πi (E ′))µi for
all convex φ : A → R. The result follows from Sherman’s extension of Hardy, Littlewood,
and Polya (1929) (Sherman (1951)) which for the reader’s convenience we reproduce below




Theorem A.1. Let W be a real vector space. Let ς,ϑ be measures on W with finite supports,







for all convex ϕ if and only if











pi j = 1.
Lemma A.1. Suppose E , E ′ is belief comonotone on Π ⊂ ∆. The following statements are
equivalent.
(a)π(E ′) is an elasticity reducing transformation of π(E ).




 < |J | , following implication is true. For all u ∈U1,
π1 π2 (i.e. π1(E )≤π2(E ) and π1(E ′)≤π2(E ′))




u (y ) (31)
implies




u (y ). (32)
Hence, E ′ less elastic with respect to ambiguity than E is understood to be the precise
condition which makes expected utilities more variable in the single crossing sense of con-
dition (b) of the Lemma.
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u (x )−u (y )
u (x+p )−u (y+p ) , k2 =
u (y )−u (y+p )
u (x+p )−u (y+p ) . Take the case x > y . If (a) holds, π(E
′) = η(π(E ))
with η : Π(E ) → [0, 1] an elasticity reducing function, therefore with π1(E ) = λπ2(E ), 0 ≤





Using η(λπ2(E ))) ≥ λη(π2(E )), it is seen that a sufficient condition for this implication to
hold is that k2 ≥ 0, i.e. if u (y )−u (y +p )≥ 0, equivalently p ≤ 0. The argument establishing
it for p ≥ 0 proceeds in exactly the same way, but instead of collecting terms as in (33), we







u (y )−u (x )
u (y+p )−u (x+p ) > 0, k4 =
u (x )−u (x+p )



















The inequality corresponding toη(λπ2(E )))≥λη(π2(E )) for complementary events which is




, so as above,
using this it is seen that a sufficient condition for this implication to hold is that k4 > 0.
Noting that u (y +p )−u (x+p )< 0, this occurs when u (x )−u (x+p )≤ 0, equivalently if p ≤ 0.
This establishes the desired conclusion for the case x > y . Since condition (a) is symmetric
with respect to the event E and its complement, taking x > y is clearly immaterial.
To establish (b )⇒ (a ). Assume not (a). Specifically, that there are π1,π2 ∈ Π, π2(E ) >
π1(E ),π2(E ′)≥π1(E ′), 0<λ< 1 such that
π1(E
′) =λπ1(E ), π2(E
′)>λπ2(E ).
Hence, for some b > 0 sufficiently small
π1(E
′)<λπ1(E )− b ,π2(E ′)>λπ2(E )− b .




< |J | , u ∈U1 such thatλ=
u (x+p )−u (y+p )
u (x )−u (y ) ,
b = u (y )−u (y+p )u (x )−u (y ) , this contradicts the implication (31) to (32). Conducting the analogous ex-
ercise for complementary events completes the proof.
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Definition A.1. Let P be a class of preferences overF strictly partially ordered by (P )-more
ambiguity averse. Given events E ,E ′ ∈ Σ, we say E is a (P )-ALTERNATIVE more ambigu-
ous(II) event than E ′ if, for A,B∈P , x , y , p , q ∈ X , with x > y ,
x E ′y A (A) p E y ⇒ x E ′y B (B ) p E y
and
x (¬E ′)y A (A)q (¬E )y ⇒ x (¬E ′)y B (B ) q (¬E )y ,
whenever B is (P )-more ambiguity averse than A.
Proposition A.1. Either letP =P SU1,µ or, letP =P
M
U1,Π
, with Π is a compact, convex subset
of∆. Consider two events, E , E ′ ∈Σ. The following are equivalent:
(i) E is a (P )-ALTERNATIVE more ambiguous (II) event than E ′;
(ii) The act x E y is a (P )-more ambiguous (II) act than x E ′y for each x , y ∈ J ⊂ X .
Proof. A construction similar to that in the proof of Lemma A.1 establishes the equiva-
lence of (P )-ALTERNATIVE more ambiguous(II) event and π(E ′) is an elasticity reducing
transformation ofπ(E ). (The construction essentially involves setting the quantities k2 and
k4 in the proof equal to zero.) This establishes the equivalence when the events are belief
comonotone on some set Π⊂∆. Reference to the proofs of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 makes
clear that this condition also suffices in the general case.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3.3]
Choices between bets on events E and E ′ by preferences in P =P MU1,Π depend on the
beliefs Π only through the set {(π(E ),π(E ′)) | π ∈ Π} ⊂ [0, 1]2. Indeed, they only depend on
this set through the extremes minπ∈Ππ(E ), minπ∈Ππ(E ′), maxπ∈Ππ(E ), maxπ∈Ππ(E ′). Choices









π(E ′))} ⊂ [0, 1]2.
By this construction, E , E ′ are belief comonotone on Π′. With these observations in
place, we may apply Lemma A.1. Condition (b) of the Lemma is necessary and sufficient
for E to be aP MU1,Π′-m.a.(II) than E




< |J | , x > y and
fix u ∈U1. Condition (b) is a single crossing condition on expected utilities. If the expected
utilities do not cross for some p , there is nothing to prove since the implication holds triv-
ially. Suppose therefore given some p that there is a crossing as specified. This is easily
seen to imply maxΠ′(E )−minΠ′(E )>maxΠ′(E ′)−minΠ′(E ′) otherwise the crossing would
have the wrong sign, i.e. be from positive to negative, rather than from negative to positive.
Also, therefore, maxΠ′(E ) >maxΠ′(E ) ≥minΠ′(E ′) >minΠ′(E ) otherwise there would be
no crossing. For preferences in P M{u},Π, this implies there is some preference with ambigu-
ity aversion parameter α which is indifferent between the bets, but those more ambiguity
averse prefer the bet on E ′ and those less ambiguity averse prefer the bet on E . Hence, con-
dition (a) of Lemma A.1 for the beliefΠ′ holds, equivalently given convexity ofΠ′ condition
(ii) of Proposition 3.3 holds.
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The following Lemma is known. The sufficiency part is implicit in e.g. Karlin and Novikoff
(1963), or see e.g. Gollier (2001, Chapter 4) for a more explicit discussion.
Lemma A.2. Let F and G be distribution functions with supports in an interval I ⊂R. The
following two conditions are equivalent.
(a)
´
I υAd G ≥ (>)
´
I υAd F ⇒
´
I υB d G ≥ (>)
´
I υB d F for all integrable nondecreasing
functions υA, υB : I →R with υA more concave than υB (υA is a continuous concave trans-
formation of υB ).
(b) Single crossing. R can be partitioned into two intervals (one of which may be null),
R=I 1∪I 2, I 1 < I 2 such that F ≥G on I 1, F ≤G on I 2. Equivalently, for all y1, y2 ∈R, y1 < y2,
we have F (y1)<G (y1)⇒ F (y2)≤G (y2).
Proof. (b ) ⇒ (a ). Let the random variable X have cdf F and Y have cdf G , denote the
cdf of υA(X ), by FA and υA(Y ) by GA. Denote GA − FA = HA. If (a) holds then, equivalently,´
υA (I )
v d HA(v )≥ (>)0⇒
´
υA (I )
ϕ(v )d HA(v )≥ (>)0 wheneverϕ is nondecreasing concave. In-
tegration by parts gives the implication
´
υA (I )
HA(v )d v ≤ (<) 0 ⇒
´
υA (I )
HA(v )dϕ(v ) ≤ (<)0
and since ϕ is absolutely continuous, we may write
ˆ
υA (I )




′(v )d v ≤ (<)0 (35)
for some ϕ′ > 0 on the interior of υA(I ). If HA(v ) has a uniform sign, there is stochastic
dominance and (a) holds trivially. If (b) holds, there can only be one change of sign, which
is from negative to positive. Suppose therefore, HA(v ) ≤ 0 for v ≤ v ′ and HA(v ) ≥ 0 for







d v ≥ 0, so ϕ′(v ′)
´
υA (I )
HA(v )d v ≥´
υA (I )
HA(v )ϕ′(v )d v. Therefore, (35) holds, as required.
(a ) ⇒ (b ). If there are x1 < x2 ∈ I with F (x1) > G (x1) and F (x2) < G (x2) then with
υA(x ) defined to equal 0 on x < x1, 1 on x1 ≤ x < x2, 1+B on x ≥ x2, with B =
F (x1)−G (x1)
G (x2)−F (x2) one
verifies that
´
I υAd F =
´
I υAd G . However, withϕ(v ) =min{v, 1},
´
I ϕ(υA)d F = 1−F (x1)<´
I ϕ(υA)d G = 1−G (x1), this contradicts (a).
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3.4]



































π(E ′)u (x )+ (1−π(E ′))u (y )

dµ
whenever u ∈ U1, φA : u (X ) → R, φB : u (X ) → R, and φA is more concave than φB . By





p )≤ v }) and G (v ) =µ({π |π(E ′)u (x )+(1−π(E ′))u (y )}) that F,G satisfies the single crossing
condition described in part (b) of that Lemma. Suppose x > y without loss of generality.
With Z a real random variable uniformly distributed on [0, 1], for any distribution function
F with inverse F −1(ξ) = inf{η ∈ R+ | F (η) > ξ}, F (x ) = Pr[F −1(Z ) ≤ x ]. Hence, in our case,
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F −1(Z ) has the same distribution as does π(E ) under the probability measure µ. Similarly





































G −1(z )u (x ) + (1−G −1(z ))u (y )

d z .




+ (1− F −1(z ))u (y +p )
and G −1(z )u (x ) + (1−G −1(z )u (y ) as z traverses [0, 1], in the sense of condition (b) of that
Lemma. Since F −1(z ) and G −1(z ) are comonotone random variables, application of Lemma
A.1 is permissible (admitting the obvious change of notation) therefore there exists an elas-
ticity reducing functionη such that F −1(Z ) =η(G −1(Z )). Recalling, that F −1(Z )has the same
distribution as π(E ) as required and G −1(Z ) as π(E ), the result follows.
A.2 Proofs of results in Section 4
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4.1] (ii) implies (i): From the preference representation (3),








u ( f )dπ.
It follows from Π is centrally symmetric, that there is πu ∈ arg minπ∈Π
´




S u ( f )dπ such that 0.5π
u+0.5πu =π?. Hence, for all u ∈U1, VΠ,0.5,u ( f ) =
´




π∗ . Similarly, VΠ,0.5,u (g ) =
´





π∗ . This establishes that all ambiguity
neutral elements of the preference class are indifferent between f and g . Since
´










u ( f )dπ−min
π∈Π
ˆ







it follows immediately from this fact and the above preference representation that VΠ,α,u ( f )≤
VΠ,α,u (g ) for all ambiguity averse elements (α ≥ 0.5). Similarly, all ambiguity loving prefer-
ences prefer f to g . Hence, the conditions of Definition 2.3 apply.
(i) implies (ii): GivenΠ is a convex centrally symmetric
´




u ( f )dπ,
π ∈Π} are convex and centrally symmetric. Moreover, they have the same center. This im-
plies, for each u ∈U1 either
´












u (g )dπ,π ∈Π
	
. The same argument as given above implies that if for some u ∈ U1,
´
u ( f )dπ,π ∈Π
	$ ´ u (g )dπ,π ∈Π	, then all ambiguity averse preferences inP M{u},Π strictly
prefer f to g . Hence, the set inclusion condition is also necessary.
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(iii) implies (i): Suppose that g is a center preserving π-garbling of f , then P fπ∗ = P
g
π∗
(equation (12)). Hence, VΠ,0.5,u ( f ) = VΠ,0.5,u (g ) for all the risk neutral elements ofP MU1,Π, i.e.,
part (i) of Definition 2.3 holds. To establish part (ii) it will suffice to show that if g is a center





ud P fπ −minπ∈Π
ˆ
X
ud P fπ ≥maxπ∈Π
ˆ
X
ud P gπ −minπ∈Π
ˆ
X
ud P gπ (36)
since this implies g is preferred (dispreferred) to f when α > 0.5 (α < 0.5). Evidently, since


















































π′ . The same argument applied to min rather









π , hence (36) is established as required.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4.2] (i)⇔(ii):
Denote
´
S u (g )dπ = g
u (π),
´
S u ( f )dπ = f
u (π). fu ,gu are µ-integrable functions. We re-












u = µ ◦ fu−1,µgu = µ ◦ g−1 and Y is the closed convex hull of u (X ). By Theorem 2 of
Strassen (1965), there exists a dilation D , a stochastic kernel from (Y ,BY ) to itself such that







gu (x ) (38)
and ˆ
Y
y d Dx (y ) = x , x ∈ Y . (39)
Hence, from (38)




u−1 (x )) =
ˆ
∆






on the sigma algebra generated by fu , where K uπ (C ) =Dgu (π)(f
u (C )),π ∈∆, C ∈ fu (BY ). Since,´
∆ f
u d K uπ = g






u ( f )dπ









































































The inequality is an application of Jensen’s inequality. This shows all ambiguity averse pref-
erences inP weakly prefer g to f . By the same argument all ambiguity seeking preferences
weakly prefer f to g and all ambiguity neutral are indifferent.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4.3]




≤ |J | , either (a)
´
u (g )dπ≥´













u ( f +p )dπ.
If (a) holds, all preferences in P M{u},Π unanimously prefer either f + p or g and there is
nothing to prove. If (b) holds, there is someα′ ∈ (0, 1) such that VΠ,α′,u ( f +p ) =VΠ,α′,u (g ) and,
moreover VΠ,α,u ( f +p ) < VΠ,α,u (g ) for each 1 ≥ α > α′, and VΠ,α,u ( f +p ) > VΠ,α,u (g ) for each
α′ >α≥ 0.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4.4]
Straightforward application of Lemma A.2.
A.3 Proofs of results in Section 5
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5.1] (i i )⇒ (i ).
Suppose (i ) does not hold. Then there exist π′,π′′ ∈ Π such that π′′(E ) > π′(E ) and
π′′(E ′) < π′(E ′). Let Π′ = co ({π′,π′′}) . Choose a preference from P MU1,Π′ with u ∈ U1 such
that u (x ) > u (y ), and with ambiguity preference parameter α = 1. For this preference,
x E y ∼ z E ′y implies z > y , and, therefore,
VΠ′,1,u (x E y ) =π
′(E )u (x ) + (1−π′(E ))u (y )
=VΠ′,1,u (z E
′y ) =π′′(E ′)u (z ) + (1−π′′(E ′))u (y ).
Whereas
















π′′′(E ′)u (z ) + (1−π′′′(E ′))u (y )

for someπ′′′ ∈ co ({π′,π′′}) . The indifference condition x E y ∼ z E ′y ∼ fλ, requires VΠ′,1,u ( fλ) =
λVΠ′,1,u (x E y )+(1−λ)VΠ′,1,u (z E ′y ). This in turn requires π′′′(E ) =π′(E ) and π′′′(E ′) =π′′(E ′)
which is impossible since π′′′ ∈ coc o ({π′,π′′}) , given the initial assumptions on π′,π′′.
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(i )⇒ (i i ):
Belief comonotonicity implies that for each u ∈U1, and compact, convex Π′ ⊆Π, x > y












u (x E y )dπ+ (1−λ)
ˆ












u (z E y )dπ

.
Hence, VΠ′,1,u (x E y ) =VΠ′,1,u (z E ′y ) implies VΠ′,1,u ( fλ) =VΠ′,1,u (x E y ) =VΠ′,1,u (z E y ). The same
argument obtains with the min operator replaced by max, from which the conclusion is ex-
tended to VΠ′,α,u ( fλ) =VΠ′,α,u (x E y ) =VΠ′,α,u (z E y ) as required.
Proof. [Proof of Remark 5.1]












λπ(E ) + (1−λ)π(E ′′)

dµ
for all increasing concave φ, where to simplify notation and without loss of generality we
have normalized so that u (x )−u (y ) = 1, u (y ) = 0. If x E ′y ∼ x E ′′y for all ambiguity averse
∈ P SU1,µ, then one can verify that π(E
′) and π(E ′′) have identical distributions under the
measure µ. Given belief comonotonicity, the pair π(E ),π(E ′) are similarly ordered. Noting
that for each 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the function (a , b ) 7→ φ (λa + (1−λ)b ) is supermodular, the result
follows from Lorentz (1953) rearrangement inequality.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5.2]
For theP =P MU1,Π case: Belief comonotonicity on Π forces ΠE ,E ′ = {(π(E ),π(E
′))|π ∈ Π}
to be a nondecreasing arc in the unit square, thereby restricting the dimension of ΠE ,E ′ to
be no more than one. Given Π is compact convex, this arc is the convex hull of the two
points, (minΠ(E ′), minΠ(E )) and (maxΠ(E ′), maxΠ(E )). Hence, the characterizing condi-
tion in Proposition 3.3 reduces to condition (i) of Proposition 5.2. For the P =P SU1,µ case:
Applying Proposition 3.4, gives π(E ′) has the same distribution as η(π(E )), for some elas-
ticity reducing function η : {π(E )|π ∈ suppµ}→ [0, 1]. Since E , E ′ are belief comonotone on
suppµ, this implies π(E ′) =η(π(E )) for almost all π ∈ suppµ.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5.3] (ii)⇒(i):
Let ux ∈U1 denote the simple step function, ux (x ′) = 0 if x ′ ≤ x , ux (x ′) = 1 otherwise.
The condition
´
ux ( f (s ))dπ1(s ) ≤
´
ux ( f (s ))dπ2(s ) becomes π1(E fx ) ≥ π2(E
f
x ), similarly for
act g . Hence if condition (ii) of the proposition holds, then π1(E fx ) ≥ π2(E
f
x ) and π1(E
g
x ) ≥
π2(E gx ) for each π1,π2 ∈Π, x ∈ X .
(i)⇒(ii): suppose (i) holds, this implies there is a linear order µ on Π such that π1 µ π2
⇔ π1(E fx ) ≥ π2(E
f
x ) and π1(E
g
x ) ≥ π2(E
g
x ) for each x ∈ X . Since πi (E
f
x ) = P
f
πi
(x ), πi (E gx ) =
P gπi (x ), i = 1, 2, the result follows by a straightforward application of stochastic dominance
(e.g. Müller and Stoyan (2002), Theorem 1.2.8).
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Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5.4]




π are mixture linear (equation (2) in Sec-





ud P fπ are both nondecreasing on Π in the linear order µU1 . Hence, since Π is com-
pact, there exist top and bottom elements of Π, denoted respectively π and π such for all
u ∈U1, π ∈ Π,
´
ud P fπ ≤
´
ud P fπ ≤
´
ud P fπ and
´
ud P gπ ≤
´
ud P gπ ≤
´
ud P gπ . Hence, λ :








(i)⇔(ii): Suppose (i i ) holds, then for u ∈U1,
α
ˆ
ud P fπ + (1−α)
ˆ
ud P fπ ≥ (≤)α
ˆ
ud P gπ + (1−α)
ˆ
ud P gπ (40)
whenever α ≥ (≤)0.5. That is, it is necessary and sufficient that αP fπ + (1− α)P
f
π stochas-
tically dominates αP gπ + (1− α)P
g
π for α ≥ 0.5 and is stochastically dominated by it when
α≤ 0.5. Noting that f , g ∈ F̂ implies P fπ (x ) =π(E
f
x ), x ∈ X , the condition (40) is equivalent
to απ(E fx ) + (1−α)π(E
f
x ) ≤ (≥) απ(E
g
x ) + (1−α)π(E
g
x ) whenever α ≥ (≤) 0.5. Since Π is cen-
trally symmetric, choosingα= 0.5 givesπ∗(E fx ) =π






















ForP =P SU1,µ: (i i )⇒ (i ) : Suppose condition (i i ) holds. Let ux ∈U1 denote the simple
step function, satisfying ux (y ) = 1 if y > x and ux (y ) = 0 if y ≤ x . Hence,
´






























for all nondecreasing concave φ. Since for E fx to be a (P ) −m .a (I ) event than E
g
x , it is




















































the implication easily follows.
(i ) ⇒ (i i ) : The reverse implication utilizes belief comonotonicity. Let u =
∑
i γi uxi ,
γi > 0, hence,
´








































































S u (g )dπ

dµ, for all concave φ, for all u of the form
u =
∑



















dµ, h = f , g .
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Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5.5](i i )⇒ (i ).
For x ∈ J , and step utilities ux : X →R, ux (y ) = 1 for x > y , 0 otherwise, we have
´
S ux ( f )dπ=
1−π(E fx ),
´
S ux (g )dπ= 1−π(E
g
x ),π ∈Π. Given belief comonotonicity, Propositions 4.3 and
4.4, for respectively the α −M E U and smooth cases, state that f (P ) −m .a .(I I ) g im-
plies
´
S ux ( f )dπ−
´
S ux (g )dπ has at most a single sign change from negative to positive
as π becomes larger (in the linear order defined by belief comonotonicity). A strict sign
change must occur, i.e.
 ´
S ux ( f )dπ−
´




S ux ( f )dπ
′−
´















a convex subset of [0, 1]2, there is an affine elasticity reducing function η : Π(E fx ) → [0, 1]
such that π(E gx ) = η(π(E
f
x )) on Π. Proposition 5.2 implies E
f
x is a (P )−m.a.(II) event than
E gx as required. The rest of condition (i) is established by observing that for 
∗∈P MU1,Π with










S ux ( f )dπ > maxπ∈Π
´
S ux (g )dπ. Similarly, for








w . For smooth ambiguity preferences, since there
are sequence of preferences in P SU1,µ whose evaluations converge to maxπ∈Π
´
S ux dπ and
minπ∈Π
´
S ux ( f )dπ, the same conclusion holds.
(i )⇒ (i i ) : Condition (i ) implies for each x ∈ J ,
 







subset of [0, 1]2 whose interior intersects the leading diagonal, and it satisfies the single




x ) ≥ (>)1−π2(E
g
x ) for π2 larger




















inherits these properties: it is a convex subset of [0, 1]2 whose interior intersects the leading
diagonal, and it satisfies the single crossing property. Equivalently,
´
S u ( f )dπ,
´
S u (g )dπ
	
π∈Π
inherits these properties, where u =
∑
λi uxi ∈U1. This establishes that
´
S u ( f )dπ,
´
S u (g )dπ
satisfy the single crossing property for any u ∈U1 which is a positive linear combination of
step functions. The result extends to any u ∈ U1 by standard arguments. Hence, for the
special case p = 0,
´
S u ( f )dπ,
´
S u (g )dπ
	
π∈Π satisfies the single crossing property (i i ) of
Proposition 4.3 and also the single crossing property (ii) of Proposition 4.4. The proof will
be completed, by establishing that this single crossing property is satisfied for each |p | ∈
|J |. To see this note that for any such p > 0 the convex set
´
S u ( f +p )dπ,
´
S u (g )dπ
	
π∈Π
is obtained from the convex set
 ´
S u (g )dπ,
´




by shifting vertically the´
S u ( f )dπ coordinate corresponding to each point π ∈ Π by an amount
´
S u ( f + p )dπ−´
S u ( f )dπ≥ 0, the
´
S u (g )dπ coordinate is evidently unchanged.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5.6]
The proof is in the text.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5.7]
The proof is in the text.
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Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5.8]
To simplify notation, we replace f +p with f throughout this proof, so for expressions





≤ |J | .
(i )⇔ (i i i ), i.e., equivalence for preferences inP SU1,µ:




































This is equivalent to the condition π1,π2 ∈ suppµ, with π1 µU1 π2ˆ
X
ud P fπ1 <
ˆ
X
ud P gπ1 ⇒
ˆ
X
ud P fπ2 ≤
ˆ
X
ud P gπ2 . (42)
To see that (41) implies (42), note that as in the proof of Proposition 5.4, since suppµ is
a convex, compact set there are top and bottom elements π and π such that λ, defined by




π vary continuously withλ and












































. That (42) implies (41) is straightforward. Hence, (42)⇔(41).
In the usual way, approximating u by
∑
αi uxi for positive αi ≥ 0, xi ∈ X , it is necessary



















The proof is completed by showing that condition (iii) of Proposition 5.8 is equivalent to
the negation of the inequalities (43). With











negation of (43) asserts the convex hull of Y = {(y1(x ), y2(x )) | x ∈R} ⊂R2 does not intersect
the orthant O = {(y1, y2) ∈ R2 | y1 > 0, y2 < 0}. Equivalently, by the separating hyperplane















, x ∈ X .
(i )⇔ (i i ), i.e., equivalence for preferences in P MU1,Π: By Definition 2.4 and Proposition




ud P fπ + (1−α)
ˆ
X





























has (at most) single sign change from negative to positive as α increases from 0 to 1. This
rules out the configuration A < 0, B > 0 but all others are admissible. As in the previous,
P SU1,µ, part of the proof, choosing u to be step functions and arbitrary convex combinations
of step functions requires that Y be separated fromO. Also as above, this establishes con-
dition (iii) withπ1 =π,π2 =π. Using the convexity ofΠ, and the fact that P fπ , P
g
π are mixture
linear, the equivalence is seen to extend to all π1 µU1 π2 ∈Π.
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A.4 Proofs of results in Section 6
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 6.1]





u (θ x )d P fπ (x )+ (1−α)maxπ∈Π
ˆ
X
u (θ x )d P fπ (x ) =
ˆ
X
u (θ x )d P fαπ+(1−α)π.
If (θ , x ) 7→ u (θ x ) is supermodular on the lattice [0, 1]×X (with the partial order (θ , x ) larger
than (θ ′, x ′) if θ ≥ θ ′ and x ≥ x ′), then (θ , P ) 7→
´
X u (θ x )d P (x ) is easily seen to be super-
modular on the lattice [0, 1]×(space of probability distributions on X )with the partial order
(θ , P )≥ (θ ′, P ′) if θ ≥ θ ′ and P first-order stochastically dominates P ′. It can be shown that
condition (ii) of Proposition 5.6 implies that for α > 12 , P
g
απ+(1−α)π first order stochastically




απ+(1−α)π first order stochastically dominates
P gαπ+(1−α)π. The result follows immediately from standard monotone comparative statics re-
sults (see, e.g., Milgrom and Shannon (1994)).
Remark A.1. In light of Proposition 5.7, the following equivalence is a restatement of Tchen
(1980). Let the pair f , g ∈ F̂ be belief comonotone on suppµ for the class of utilities U1.
Then f m.a.(II) g if and only if for all supermodular functions ν : X ×∆→R,
ˆ
X ×∆
νd P f ,µ ≥
ˆ
X ×∆
νd P g ,µ.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 6.2]



















u ′ (θ ∗x ) x d P g ,µ = 0. (44)









u ′ (θ ∗x ) x d P f ,µ ≤ 0, since, by
concavity the θ satisfying the first-order condition for f must be greater than θ ∗. Since






is nonincreasing inπ ∈Π, by concav-
ity and belief comonotonicity, it follows from P f ,µ more ambiguous (I) than P g ,µ (Remark




























u ′ (θ ∗x ) x d P f ,µ ≤ 0.
















u ′ (θ ∗x ) x d P f ,µ ≤ 0. (45)
















d P f ,µ = 0. (46)
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π , ζ is a nondecreasing function by as-
sumption (Remark 5.5). If φ′ is log-convex, then
φ′(η−ζ)
φ′(η) is nondecreasing in η for all ζ < 0









































































has at most a single sign change which is from positive to negative if one occurs. The rest
of the proof is standard. Since π 7→
´
X u


















u ′ (w +θ ∗x ) x d P fπ −k

dµ≤ 0.
Using (46) this is easily seen to imply (45) as required.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 6.3]
For the case ofα-MEU preferences, one obtains, by the envelope theorem, the first order
condition
u ′(y1−a ) =α
ˆ
u ′(y2+a )d P
f
π (y2) + (1−α)
ˆ
u ′(y2+a )d P
f
π (y2)), (47)




ud P fπ + (1−α)
ˆ
ud P fπ =α
ˆ
ud P gπ + (1−α)
ˆ
ud P gπ (48)
means the first order condition is unchanged
α
ˆ
u ′d P fπ + (1−α)
ˆ
u ′d P fπ =α
ˆ
u ′d P gπ + (1−α)
ˆ
u ′d P gπ .
As noted in Gierlinger and Gollier (2008), Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952)’s general-




is concave if x 7→ −ϕ′(x )/ϕ′′(x ) is a concave function. Hence, withυ1(π) =
´
u (y2+s1)d P fπ (y2),
υ2(π) =
´
u (y2+ s2)d P fπ (y2), υλ(π) =
´
u (y2+λs1+(1−λ)s2)d P fπ (y2)we have λMφ(υ1)+ (1−
45
λ)Mφ(υ2)≤Mφ(λυ1+(1−λ)υ2). It follows that if u is strictly concave, a 7→V
f
S (a ) is strictly









































since, a strict inequality will require a reduction in savings to restore the first order con-
























U ′g dµ. (49)
where Uf =
´




u ′d P fπ and Ug =
´





























Note that the function eφ(U ) =φ′(U )U is a nondecreasing concave transformation ofφ on
R−. Nondecreasing is immediate, the concavity part can be seen from the fact that the ratio
of derivatives






is the product of two positive decreasing function and therefore decreasing. The result now













dµ for any eφ which is a concave transformation of φ.
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A.5 More ambiguous sets of lotteries
Recall a lottery is, formally, an element of L , the set of distributions over X with finite sup-
ports. Let 2L denote the set of all subsets of L and L ≡ 2L\;, LJ ≡ 2L J \;. Let L be a
preference relation onL .
Definition A.2. Let P L be a class of preferences overL . Let LA ,
L
B ∈ P
L . We say LB is
(P L )-more objective ambiguity averse than LA if, for all l ∈ L andL f ∈L , L f 
L
B {l }⇒
L f LA {l } andL f 
L
A {l }⇒L f 
L
B {l }.
Notation. GivenL f ∈L and x ∈ X ,L f +δx denotes the set of lotteries

l +δx | l ∈L f
	
.
Definition A.3. Let P L be a class of preferences over L . We say P L is strictly partially
ordered by (P L )-more objective ambiguity averse if for each L∈ P L there exists ̃L ∈
P L , L 6= ̃L , such that L is (P L )-more o b j e c t i v e ambiguity averse than ̃L or ̃L is
(P L )-more o b j e c t i v e ambiguity averse than L .
The following is the analog of more ambiguous (II), applied to preferences over sets of
lotteries.
Definition A.4. Let P L be a class of preferences over L strictly partially ordered by (P L )-
more objective ambiguity averse. Given sets of lotteries L f ,Lg ∈ LJ , we say L f is a (P L )-





















, whenever LB is (P
L )-more
objective ambiguity averse than LA .
We do not suggest an analog for more ambiguous (I) applied to preferences over sets
of lotteries. While it may appear such an extension is straightforward, a problem is the lit-
erature does not identify candidate definitions of ambiguity neutral, in general, for such
classes of preferences. The difficulty follows from the fact that the setting makes no refer-
ence to a state space (and subjective beliefs).28
Olszewski (2007) characterizes a class of preferences over sets of lotteries wherein the
DM evaluates a set of lotteriesL f ∈L according to the rule:










E u (l )

, (50)
where E u (l ) ≡
´
u (x )d l (x ) is the expected utility of lottery l . The parameter α can be
interpreted as a measure of the DM’s attitude to objective ambiguity: if αi corresponds to
a DM i = A, B , then DM A is more objective ambiguity averse than DM B if and only if
αA ≥αB .
Ahn (2008) characterizes another class of preferences over sets of lotteries, proposing
the following evaluation for a set of lotteriesL f ∈L :
V Lm ,φ,u (L f ) =
´







φ (E u (l ))d m|L f (52)
28Note, Olszewski (2007) and Ahn (2008) only define and characterize comparative ambiguity aversion (and
not absolute ambiguity aversion).
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where E u (l ) ≡
´
u (x )d l (x ) is the expected utility of lottery l , m is a probability measure
on L , and φ is an increasing transformation applied to u . This DM considers all of the
relevant lotteries in L f when making his decision, with their relative consideration fixed
across sets by a measure over all lotteries. Her attitude to ambiguity is, in part, captured by
the transformationφ. In particular, V Lm ,φA ,u is more objective ambiguity averse than V
L
m ,φB ,u
if and only ifφA = h◦φB , where h :φB (u (X ))→R is concave.
The following two results provide characterizations of more ambiguous sets of lotteries
for preferences proposed by Olszweski and Ahn. The statements are exact analogs of those
for Propositions 4.3 and 4.4; the proofs obtain as straightforward adaptations of the proofs
for those propositions, respectively.





. The following are equiva-
lent:




-more ambiguous set of lotteries thanLg ;























E u (l ) .
.





. The following are equiv-
alent:




-more ambiguous set of lotteries thanLg ;















































The following proposition involves sets of lotteries induced by acts. Given π ∈ ∆, any
act f ∈F induces a corresponding lottery P fπ (x ), a probability distribution over outcomes.




π∈Π ∈ L .
Consider a probability measure µ : B∆ −→ [0, 1] , with suppµ = Π ⊆ ∆. Since π 7−→ P fπ
is aB∆ measurable function, the measure µ induces, uniquely, a probability measure on
L f ,Π which we denote as m f ,µ. Finally, given a pair of acts f , g , suppose m is a measure on
∆ (∆ (X )) (or, equivalently, onL ) such that m|L f ,Π =m f ,µ and m|Lg ,Π =mg ,µ.
Proposition A.4. Consider a probability measure µ :B∆ −→ [0, 1] such that suppµ=Π⊆∆
is compact, convex and that given the class of utilities U1, the pair of acts f , g ∈ F̂J is belief
comonotone on Π. Then the following are equivalent:




 ≤ |J |, there exist λ1,λ2 ≥ 0, λ1 +λ2 = 1
such that for all x ∈ J ,
λ1(1−P f +pπ1 (x ))+λ2P
f +p
π2

























A.6 Vector Expected Utility
The Vector Expected Utility model (Siniscalchi 2009) is represented as,
V ( f ) =
ˆ
S




ζu ( f )d P

,
where,ζ= (ζ1, . . . ,ζn ) is is vector random variable, or adjustment factor, that satisfies
´
S ζd P =
0. The function A : R→R is constrained to satisfy A(0) = 0, A(−x ) = A(x ), x ∈ Rn. We will
consider the class of VEU preferences,V (P,U1)with a given, common, baseline prior P , and
u ∈U1. We wish to characterize more ambiguous (I) events for this preference class.
We will work with the equivalent representation noted by Siniscalchi (2009, p.808), in
which the n−dimensional adjustment factor ζ can be represented by the vector of signed
measures m = (m1, . . . , mn ), m : B (S ) → Rn, where for each i = 1, . . . , n , mi is absolutely
continuous with respect to P and has Radon-Nikodym derivative d mid P = ζi , and mi (S ) = 0.
A VEU preference is ambiguity averse according to Axiom 9 of Siniscalchi (2009) if and
only if A is concave. Such a preference is ambiguity neutral iff A ≡ 0. Consider two acts f and
g such that
´
S u ( f )d P =
´
S u (g )d P but V ( f )≤V (g ) for all ambiguity averse preferences in











u (g )d m

.
Let the act f represent a bet on the event E and g denote a bet of the same monetary
value on the event E ′. Without loss of generality we may assume the bet pays 1 if the event
occurs and 0 if not.
Proposition A.5. Consider the class of VEU preferences,V (P,U1)with n-dimensional adjust-
ment factorζ= d md P , A :Rn→R, A(x ) = A(−x ), A concave. An event E is (V )-more ambiguous
(I ) than event E ′ if and only if the following conditions hold:
(a) P (E ) = P (E ′) and
(b)m (E ′) =βm (E ), for some scalar −1≤β ≤ 1.
Proof. Sufficiency. Condition (a) implies all ambiguity neutral preferences in the class are
indifferent between the two gambles. Conditions (a) and (b) together imply that m (E ′) is in
the convex hull of m (E ) and −(m (E ). Hence, by linearity
´
u (g )d m = (u (1)−u (0))m (E ′) is
in the convex hull of
´
u ( f )d m and−
´
u ( f )d m . Since A(
´
u ( f )d m = A(−
´
u ( f )d m and A
is concave, it follows that A(
´
u ( f )d m )) ≤ A(
´
u (g )d m . This establishes that all ambiguity
averse members of the preference class prefer the bet on E ′ as required.
Necessity. Condition (a) is necessary for all ambiguity neutral members of the prefer-
ence class to be indifferent between the two gambles. Suppose therefore that (a) holds.
Choose the utility function u so the utility from winning is unity and losing is zero. It suf-
fices to show that if (b) fails to hold, there is a function A satisfying the conditions of the
proposition such that A(m (E )) < A(m (E ′). To this end, let bi ∈ Rn , i = 1, ..., n − 1 chosen
so that {b , ..., bn−1} a basis for the n − 1 dimensional subspace orthogonal to m (E ) . De-
fine A⊥ : [0, 1]n → R, A⊥(x ) = mi n{b1 · x ,−b1 · x , . . . , bn−1 · x ,−bn−1 · x }. A⊥ is the point-
wise minimum of a family of linear functions and so is concave. It also evidently satis-
fies A⊥(x ) = A⊥(−x ). Moreover, by construction, A⊥(m (E )) = 0 and A⊥(x ) < 0 for all x not
collinear with m (E ). It follows that if E ′ is less ambiguous than E , m (E ) and m (E ′) are
collinear. Choosing some strictly concave A establishes that m (E ′)must lie in that part of
this linear set which is the convex hull of m (E ) and −m (E ).
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In order to better relate this result with our discussion of other representations, we de-
fine Q as the vector valued measure Q = (Q1, . . . ,Qn ) = (P +m1, . . . , P +mn ). Note that for
each i = 1, . . . , n ,
´
S dQi=1. The following corollary considers the special case, of Q , when
the (Qi )i=1,...,n is a family of probability measures on S .
Corollary A.1. Consider the class of VEU preferences, V (P,U1) with n-dimensional adjust-
ment factor ζ = d md P , A :Rn→R, A(x ) = A(−x ), A concave. Let Qi = P +mi , i = 1, . . . , n. Fur-
thermore, suppose (Qi )i=1,...,n is a family of probability measures on S . An event E is (V )-more
ambiguous (I ) than event E ′ if and only if the following conditions hold:
(a) P (E ) = P (E ′) and
(b)Qi (E ′) = (1−β )P (E ) +βQi (E ), i = 1, . . . , n for some −1≤β ≤ 1.
B Appendix: On the non-uniqueness of representation ofα−MEU
preferences
It is well known, especially since Siniscalchi (2006), that α−MEU preferences do not neces-
sarily have a unique representation.29 One may query if the more ambiguous relation iden-
tified by a characterization obtained in one of the Propositions is affected by the particular
representation (of the referenced preference class) chosen in the arguments. However, that
is not the case; the characterization for more ambiguous derived depends on the ordinal
properties of the referenced preference class itself, rather than any particular representa-
tion chosen for it.
Our definitions of more ambiguous are purely in terms of ordinal properties of the ref-
erenced preference class: an event (or an act) is more ambiguous than another if any DMs
(one of whom has to ambiguity neutral in case of m.a. (I)) related by more ambiguity averse
relation, order the acts in certain ways. Ambiguity neutrality and more ambiguity averse are
defined using ordinal properties: a preference is ambiguity neutral irrespective of of the
representation we may choose for it, and two preferences remain related by more ambigu-
ity averse in the same way irrespective of the preference representation. Our propositions
characterize these definitions and hence, a pair of acts/events identified as being related by
more ambiguous in a characterization satisfies the ordinal properties required in the def-
inition of more ambiguous. Since, alternative preference representations preserve ordinal
properties, the identification of more ambiguous relation does not turn on a representation
chosen for the referenced preference class. In following, we illustrate this general point for
the cases of Propositions 3.1 and 4.1, which deal with m.a.(I) for α−MEU preferences.
B.1 Events
We show that the more ambiguous (I) relation between events identified in in Proposition
3.1 remains unchanged when we use a generic MEU representation for the reference class
of preferences as an alternative to the representation used in the Proposition.
29While one does not obtain unique representation in general, there are important special cases where
appropriate restrictions on the state space yields beliefs to be uniquely identified. For example, Gul and
Pesendorfer (2014) axiomatize a model which has as a special case α−MEU preferences that are represented
by a set of priors corresponding to the core of a belief function. See also, Klibanoff, Mukerji, and Seo (2014).
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If α> 12 , then given central symmetry, since the minimizing and maximizing π’s must aver-








where Π ⊇ Πα = {π ∈ Π | π = (1−λ)π∗ +λπ′, π′ ∈ Π} with λ = 2α− 1. A similar alternative












where Π⊇Πα = {π ∈Π |π= λπ∗+ (1−λ)π′, π′ ∈Π} with λ= 2α. Hence, the preference rep-
resented by VΠ,α,u has the alternative representation VΠα,1,u . In either case, as α ranges over
the interval [0, 1] from 0 to 1 , the DM becomes more ambiguity averse, via the linear rela-
tionship between α and λ. We may say that for the preference VΠα,1,u , α indexes ambiguity
attitude because VΠα,1,u has the alternative representation VΠ,α,u (for which interpretation,
we appeal to Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004), Proposition 12).
Note thatΠα is simply a radial contraction ofΠabout its centerπ
∗. Moreover, limα→1Πα =
limα→0Πα = Π, limα→ 12 Πα = {π
∗} . Evidently, therefore, in the notation of Proposition 3.1 of
the paper, Π(E ′) ⊂ Π(E ) and π∗(E ′) = π∗(E ) is equivalent to Πα(E ′) ⊂ Πα(E ) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
and π∗α(E
′) = π∗α(E ). That is, E , E
′ satisfy centered expansion conditions Π(E ′) ⊂ Π(E ) and
π∗(E ′) = π∗(E ) if and only if they satisfy Πα(E ′)⊂Πα(E ) for all 0≤ α≤ 1 and π∗α(E
′) = π∗α(E ).
Hence, a pair of events is characterized to be ordered in a particular way by more ambigu-
ous (I) using the representation VΠ,α,u if and only if the pair is characterized to be ordered
in the same way by more ambiguous (I) using the representation VΠ,α,u .
B.2 Acts
Similarly for acts. Consider Proposition 4.1, this is stated in terms of preference classes but
the proof used the representation (53). It is easy to see how the same (of course) Proposition
emerges if instead we use the above alternative representation of preferences. Proposition
4.1 gives as a(n equivalent) condition for f to be more ambiguous than g that
´
u ( f )dπ
	
π∈Π,
the interval of expected utilities of act f asπ ranges overΠ contains the equivalent interval
for the act g and have the same centers. Suppose instead we represent preferences in the
alternative formulation, in terms of Πα, the interval of expected utilities
´




act f as π ranges over Πα is completely determined by the interval
´
u ( f )dπ
	
π∈Π. Specif-
ically, for the ambiguity averse case α > 1/2, by the definition of Πα,
´





































in which case, of course, mi nπ∈Πα
´
u (g )dπ ≥mi nπ∈Πα
´
u ( f )dπ . So, all ambiguity averse
DMs prefer g to f as before. Similarly, ambiguity seekers prefer f to g and ambiguity neu-
tral DM’s are indifferent. Thus, we recover our definition of more ambiguous (I). That is, a
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pair of acts is characterized to be ordered in a particular way by more ambiguous (I) using
the representation VΠ,α,u if and only if the pair is characterized to be ordered in the same




(minΠ(E ), minΠ(E ′))
(minΠ(E ), minΠ(E ′))
{(π(E ),η(π(E )))|π ∈Π}
{(π(E ),π(E ′))|π ∈Π}
Figure 1: Illustration of E m.a.(II) event than E ′ for α-MEU and smooth ambiguity.
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